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Chapter One – Introduction – Scatology, Liminality, and the Failure of the Body
Shit is central to the human experience. St. Augustine of Hippo is famously credited with
the epigram, “Inter faeces et urinam nascimur.”1 The phrase serves as a reminder of the
inescapable scatological components of humanity: “Between shit and piss we are born.” Life
begins amidst points of excretion, and excretion is a function essential for life to continue.
Literature, serving as it does as a mirror of life, has not neglected to address this excrement. The
study of excrement is termed scatology, and literature across cultures and periods of history is
rife with examples of excrement used as a serious, symbolic image. In his Inferno, Dante
portrays sinners submerged in a ditch of feces to express the filthiness of their transgressions.
Yeats uses the oddly prescient “Crazy Jane” to bluntly remind the priest who criticizes her for
her scandalous lifestyle that the spiritual life cannot be separated from the physical one. Passion,
as well as the base and the physical, are essential components of life; Crazy Jane cautions the
priest not to forget that “Love has pitched his mansion in / The place of excrement” (15-16).
Jonathan Swift uses excrement as a tool for satire; scatological images correct the pride of those
who would elevate themselves or others by reminding them of their shared base physical
necessities—even Celia shits.2
Samuel Beckett, the Irish author and expatriate who spent the most prominent portion of
his career writing plays in French, makes liberal use of excrement throughout his body of work.
Critics have noted the comic effects of Beckett’s use of scatology in an often bleak body of
work. However, the scatological elements of Beckett’s work are not a deviation from Beckett’s
absurdist goals, but an essential part of Beckett’s depiction of the human condition. In many
ways, scatology is a more significant unifying feature of Beckett’s writing than his heritage or
1

Although this phrase is commonly credited to Saint Augustine, St. Odo of Cluny, the medieval abbot and Catholic
saint, is also often attributed with this quote.
2
“The Ladies Dressing Room”

Bradford 4
immediate cultural surroundings. Born to a Protestant family and raised in Ireland, Beckett
showed little interest in either element of his religion or his nationality. His work is neither very
Protestant nor very Irish. Beckett’s early work, such as More Pricks than Kicks, is often set in
Ireland, and he owes an early poetic debt to his friend James Joyce,3 but Beckett’s later work
sheds any such semblance of Irish-ness. His writing is bleak, set in nondescript, borderless lands
populated by vagrants and aimless wanderers, avatars instead of characters, addled mouthpieces
spouting barely intelligible nonsense. The set design of Beckett’s plays is plain to the point of
barren: in Waiting for Godot, the set description consists only of three elements: “A country
road. A tree. Evening” (11). Endgame’s curtain lifts on even less: “Bare interior. Grey light”
(92). All extraneous details have been removed, leaving only the skeletal plot and setting.
Beckett’s work, at almost every level, seems consumed with eliminating.
Beckett was one of the most prominent members of what became known as the Theatre
of the Absurd, a movement comprised of European playwrights in the 1950s. Martin Esslin gave
the movement its name in 1961 in his book The Theatre of the Absurd, although he stressed that
“the dramatists whose work is here discussed do not form part of any self-proclaimed or selfconscious school or movement” (22). Instead, Esslin grouped dramatists under the umbrella term
by emphasizing their shared attitude that “certitudes and unshakable basic assumptions of former
ages have been swept away, that they have been tested and found wanting, that they have been
discredited as cheap and somewhat childish illusions” (23). This disillusionment is a hallmark of
Beckett’s writing—disillusionment with traditional modes of art, with the assurances of religion,
and with the communicative properties of language.

3

The extent of Joyce’s influence has long been a source of debate. Anthony Uhlmann’s essay “Samuel Beckett and
the Occluded Image” operates under the assumption that much of Beckett’s work is shaped by a struggle to escape
from under Joyce’s influence.
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Esslin argues that Beckett’s writing contains few definite assertions or declarations of
meaning because his work “has renounced arguing about the absurdity of the human condition; it
merely presents it in being—that is, in terms of concrete stage images” (25). Esslin’s description
of Beckett’s stage images applies beyond his plays as well. The images Beckett uses in his
novels and short fiction similarly present readers with an absurd world in which, as Vladimir
says in Waiting for Godot, there is “[n]othing to be done” (11). All of Beckett’s works occupy
the same universe where the characters’ actions are so futile that the only appropriate response is
not to rage against the absurdity but to resign oneself to the absurdity.
Esslin’s description of “an integration between the subject-matter and the form in which
it is expressed that separates the Theatre of the Absurd from the Existentialist theatre” accurately
captures the important nuances in Beckett’s work (25). Beckett’s absurd subject matter is
presented in fragmented, often absurd forms, unlike the more formal work of the Existentialists.
Although Beckett’s views may have links to Existentialist thought, Esslin warns that “we must
not go too far in trying to identify Beckett’s vision with any school of philosophy” (61). Beckett
never espoused Existentialism, and the Theatre of the Absurd is not synonymous with
Existentialism, despite similar philosophical underpinnings. Existentialism may represent an
absurd universe, but it seeks to provide the human response to such absurdity.4 Beckett’s work,
like much of the Theatre of the Absurd, does not. It revels in the absurdity of its form and
content. Beckett’s characters are impotent, unable to enact change or assimilate into society,
excluded from community and order. At numerous points in the interminable back and forth of
Vladimir and Estragon, one or the other says, “I’m going,” but this proclamation is invariably
followed by inaction, or even a blunt, sardonic stage direction: “He does not move” (14). In
4

Jean-Paul Sartre’s discussion of “The Look,” the anxiety of recognizing oneself as an object in the consciousness of
others, is startlingly similar to my own use of Lacan in analyzing Beckett’s scatology, but Sartre ostensibly sought to
prove the existence of free will, a concept that Beckett seems—at the very least—skeptical of.
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Beckett’s absurd universe, his characters see the absurdity and the horror of their situation, but
even their intention—their will—produces nothing: no action, no change. Ultimately, there is
“[n]othing to be done” (11).
Beckett’s scatology is a motif that runs throughout the body of his work. It is not the
primary theme in any individual work, but is instead a persistent discourse that emerges over and
over, gaining significance across the breadth of Beckett’s oeuvre. Beckett’s catalog is one
notable for its consistency of tone and theme; however, scatology has not been examined at
length as an essential symbolic component of his work. Because scatological images are a
recurring motif and not a sustained theme in specific works, I will be using a wide variety of
Beckett’s works to fully examine and explain Beckett’s use of these images as opposed to
individual close readings of Beckett’s texts. I will move quickly between Beckett’s texts for the
purposes of illustrating the pervasiveness of this motif as well as its consistent use throughout
Beckett’s catalog. In the course of my argument, I will refer to the plays Waiting for Godot,
Endgame, and Krapp’s Last Tape, Rough for Theatre I, Rough for Theatre II, Embers, the novels
Dream of Fair to Middling Women, Murphy, Malone Dies, Molloy, The Unnamable, the play for
radio Embers, and works from the collection of short prose pieces Stories and Texts for Nothing.
Scatology in Beckett does not provide temporary comedic relief from the bleakness of his
characters’ situations, but is instead a further expression of this absurdity. It is through scatology
that Beckett expresses his characters’ absurd internal condition; not only is the world around
them absurd, but their relationship to their own being, how they understand and perceive
themselves, is also fractured and absurd. Vladimir’s lament that there is nothing to be done
extends to the excremental failures of Beckett’s characters; they are not in control of their own
excretory functions. Beckett’s scatological images function to illustrate the alienation of
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Beckett’s characters’ absurd condition. In Molloy, the eponymous main character refers to his
“arse-hole” as “the true portal of our being” (74), one of many clues with which Beckett that
point to the significance of the scatological image. Excrement appears frequently in Beckett’s
work, often due to the failure of his characters’ excremental functions. Yet a breakdown of
biological functions does not merely serve as an opportunity for crude humor in Beckett’s work,
but is a symptom of the breakdown of Beckett’s characters’ definition of self. Anthony Uhlmann
uses the philosophy of Arnold Geulincx to come to the conclusion that, in Beckett’s universe,
“we do not understand how even the simplest movement of our own body is accomplished . . . if
you do not know how to do something, if you do not have full control over it, you cannot in fact
be said to do that thing” (90). Beckett’s characters’ inability to understand and control their own
biological functions demonstrates a breakdown in identity common to all Beckett’s characters.
The complications of normal excretory functions—diarrhea, constipation, and painful urination,
for instance—parallel Beckett’s characters’ inability to determine their own course, to move of
their own volition. Their nonsensical dialogues, as well as their inability to move, to leave, or to
find any resolution to their stories align with this breakdown in excretory function.
Beckett’s absurd language, circular dialogue, and emphasis on the play of language
through puns and double entendre mirror the function of scatology in his works—the excess of
excrement and the excess of language each express an ill-defined element of Beckett’s
characters. In the final novel of Samuel Beckett’s trilogy, The Unnamable, the eponymous main
character whose monologues, musings, and diatribes comprise the entirety of the work bemoans
his inability to harness the communicable properties of language: “…it’s like shit, there we have
it at last, there it is at last, the right word, one has only to seek, seek in vain, to be sure of finding
in the end, it’s a question of elimination” (Three Novels 368). The Unnamable is himself a
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symptom of this struggle to find the right word; there does not seem to be a right name for him, a
right word that would locate him in a linguistic system. Location in a linguistic system is
representative of existential location: naming includes placement in a system of relations to other
named objects. The Unnamable’s lack of a name stems from a larger problem: the overwhelming
inability of Beckett’s characters to find the right word. In Rough for Theatre II, Bertrand
abruptly breaks off reading one of his reports to cry, “Shit! Where’s the verb?” (243). His
sentence is missing the main verb and, unable to find the right word, Bertrand can only produce
“shit.” Similarly, because the Unnamable cannot find the correct word, he turns instead to
logorrhea, pouring forth words in a way that defeats easy comprehension. In this way, his words
are “like shit”; something to be expelled, to be eliminated.
Liz Barry refers to this profusion of meaningless language as a “purgation of self” which
is “given image and form in Beckett’s work through the use of scatology—the body excreting
itself. Familiar metaphors of writing as the excretion of waste or as sexual issue rebound on
Beckett’s narrators, and threaten their integrity as body and mind become leaky and uncertain
containers” (“Beckett, Bourdieu, and the Resistance to Consumption” 39). Scatology, like the
logorrhea of Beckett’s characters, is, for Barry, a “purgation of self”: an eliminative process
defined by what is being removed. However, the term “purgation” connotes a cleansing
process—eliminating waste constitutes a purge that theoretically should lead to purification.
Beckett’s scatology lacks such a purgative element. Because the scatological process repeats
itself endlessly, it never arrives at a final conclusion. The body does not purify itself by
eliminating waste; as waste is eliminated, the body is already digesting food into more waste that
will need to be excreted. Elimination is a function that must recur for life to continue, but not one
that is truly completed—it is a perpetual process. The lack of purification or resolution through
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excremental functions parallels the lack of resolution in Beckett’s absurd universe. Beckett’s
scatology simultaneously evokes the comic and the grotesque—that which produces horror—and
creates a universe characterized by hilarious incongruence and terrifying purposelessness.
Beckett’s scatological images are an essential component of Beckett’s depiction of a
universe where humanity is trapped in liminal space. Victor Turner’s essay “Liminal and
Liminoid” provides the foundation for my understanding of what I have termed “liminal space”
in Beckett’s work. Liminal space is what exists between two poles, the threshold that demarcates
two distinct states. Turner terms his work “comparative symbology,” which is distinct from strict
linguistics because symbology “has much to do with many kinds of nonverbal symbols in ritual
and art” (54). Ritual and drama provide Turner with useful examples for his study, as “ritual
performances” cause an individual to “‘travel through’ a single rite or work of art” (56). Both a
work of art and a social ritual cause the individual to pass from one state to another, to endure a
passage of some kind. When experiencing a work of art—viewing a painting, reading a novel,
etc.—the person experiencing the art separates from himself, enters the world the artist has
presented, and completes the process by reconciling the meaning contained within the art to his
own experiences. The person experiencing the art undergoes a passage through the artist’s
vision. A social ritual marks a defined point of separation from a previous state and entry into a
new state—a bar mitzvah that marks a boy’s entrance into adulthood, for example.
In order to define the liminal, Turner cites the work of anthropologist Arnold van Gennep
who developed three stages of a rite of passage. The individual passes from separation—a
departure from a previous state—to a stage of transition, called “margin” of “limen” by van
Gennep (57). This period of limen is “a period and area of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo
which has few . . . of the attributes of either the preceding or the subsequent profane social
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statuses or cultural states” (57). The subject passes through liminal space in its journey from
separation from a previous state to a “‘re-aggregation’5 or ‘incorporation’ [which] includes
symbolic phenomena and actions which represent the return of the subjects to their new,
relatively stable, well-defined position in the total society” (57). This liminal space is depicted in
Turner’s analysis as “a threshold which separates two distinct areas, one associated with the
subject’s pre-ritual or preliminal status, and the other with his post-ritual or postliminal status”
(58). Liminal space, then, is a transition, a threshold, not a place of residence but the space
between two states.
This understanding of liminality and the ritual process is essential to a complete view of
Beckett’s scatological images. The digestive and excretive processes of the human body form a
biological liminal space marked by neither definite ending nor beginning. Food is eaten and
excreted, but as long as it resides in the body, its existence is repressed and unacknowledged.
The byproduct of elimination, scat, is never recognized as being the consummation of a
biological process because the digestive process does not truly begin and end; instead, it is
continually occurring. Scat is also never fully acknowledged as belonging to the “ritual subject”
6

—what was once biological material comprising the subject has now become an object, distinct

from the subject despite its residence in the body. Therefore, whatever resides within the body
during this digestive process must be repressed out of the subject’s mind, or it would produce
revulsion. The process signifies a continuous liminal space—a threshold that, if fully
acknowledged, brings horror. There is no true separation or aggregation in the process from

5

Turner uses the terms “aggregation” and “re-aggregation” interchangeably in his explication of van Gennep’s
definition of rites of passage; “re-aggregation” merely emphasizes the subject’s previous state as aggregated into a
structure that it must separate from. Both words are equivalent with “incorporation.” For clarity, I will use
“aggregation” to describe that stage that marks the subject’s completed progress through the rite of passage.
6
Turner’s term for a subject undergoing the transition from separation to aggregation by passing through liminal
space.
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ingestion to excretion, merely (in the words of Beckett’s narrator) “Dish and pot, dish and pot”
(Malone Dies 179).
Beckett’s scatological images are significant because they depict the human experience
itself as liminal. Because excrement is an essential biological component of humanity, humans
are characterized by this liminality. The breakdown of excremental functions in Beckett’s
characters depicts human being as ill-defined. When Beckett’s characters lose control of their
excremental functions, their existence as defined, discrete beings comes into question. In
Endgame, when Hamm envisions an escape from their small, gray room via a raft floating down
the river, he imagines that they may meet “other . . . mammals!” (109). Hamm is aware that the
word is not right, but he lacks a word to describe himself and Clov—his refusal to use the word
“human” reflects his understanding that they cannot be accurately classified as such. In some
way, they fall short of the designation of discrete human beings. Hamm is able to speak to their
biological nature, but not their nature as unique selves. His failure to classify the characters in
Endgame as human reflects an acknowledgement of the breakdown of a fundamental aspect of
humanity. As Beckett breaks down the borders between his characters’ inner and outer selves,
the agonizing, absurd threshold they reside in becomes increasingly apparent. The scat that
appears in Beckett’s work despite his characters’ best efforts provides a motif that continually
forces their inherent biological liminality to the center of his works.
This liminality that breaks down the borders between Beckett’s characters’ inner and
outer selves illustrates the fundamentally compromised nature of these characters. In his book
The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason, Mark Johnson
defines the body as a container—that which erects a border to separate inside from outside:
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Our encounter with containment and boundedness is one of the most pervasive
features of our bodily experience. We are intimately aware of our bodies as threedimensional containers into which we put certain things (food, water, air) and out
of which other things emerge (food and water wastes, air, blood, etc.). From the
beginning, we experience constant physical containment in our surroundings
(those that envelop us). We move in and out of rooms, clothes, vehicles, and
numerous kinds of bounded spaces. We manipulate objects, placing them in
containers (cups, boxes, cans, bags, etc.). In each of these cases there are repeated
spatial and temporal organizations. (21)
One of the primary ways in which humans encounter their own biological nature is through
boundedness—the way the body contains food and water waste matter. Beckett’s characters
suffer a breakdown of this essential biological function. Their excretory functions are not the
ordered process that characterizes biological functions, but are instead painful, irrepressible,
uncontrollable, and ultimately messy. Beckett’s characters are biologically liminal, unable to
resolve their biological process in the normal fashion, and continually plagued by excretory
failures.
This biological liminality reflects humanity’s ontological liminality. In an absurd
universe, humans come from uncertain origins and move toward an ending that promises no
resolution or consummation. In a traditional religious ontology, the end of humanity (death, the
end of the world) is marked by consummation: redemption or damnation, as the case may be. In
this eschatology, the liminal aspect of human nature eventually finds resolution—aggregation
into an eternal afterlife. Beckett denies such an end or resolution to his characters. He forces
them to exist in suspension, unable to move forward or backward. The breakdown between inner
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and outer selves as suggested through scatological images emphasizes those characters’ inability
to actualize and move toward an ontological resolution. In Beckett’s universe, to be human is to
be painfully held on a threshold between the ambiguous poles of birth and death with no clear
reference points for making sense of the universe.
There is a temptation to label Beckett an existentialist due in part to hopelessness of his
absurd universe, but scatology as an assertion of liminal space rejects the existentialist label. An
existentialist response to an absurd universe necessitates a response of some kind—what does
man do in the face of an absurd universe? Beckett’s response is: nothing. In an absurd universe,
man has no significant response available to him. No matter what his actions might be, his
actions are insignificant. Beckett’s characters have no recourse to any action that might bring a
kind of consummation or resolution. Becket does not deny morality; he denies the possibility of
morality. There is no moral response to be articulated in a universe where any response mankind
can muster is inconsequential. Morality depends on the significance of individual human action;
Beckett denies this significance. Beckett’s characters’ insignificant actions illustrate their
perpetual entrapment in liminal space.
Scatology is the force that repeatedly pushes this liminality to the center of the audience’s
attention. The failure of Beckett’s characters’ excremental functions signifies a failure of
resolution that reflects the larger lack of conclusion in their stories. Beckett’s characters are
biologically and ontologically trapped in liminal space. They will not find meaning in their
universe. The question of Godot’s return is irrelevant—they could not move toward resolution if
a resolution was offered to them. If Godot returned, he would find “leaky and uncertain
containers” instead of beings with the ability to self-actualize. In this way, Godot’s very
existence is irrelevant.
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Because Beckett’s scatology reinforces the idea of human nature as liminal, his works—
primarily Waiting for Godot, where two tramps wait under a tree for a Godot that never
appears7—seem to critique the idea of a divine being by mocking not its impotence, but the
inconsequence of its existence. Beckett’s plays, novels, and short stories seem to revel in their
denial of a divine presence.8 We laugh at Vladimir and Estragon’s foolishness in continuing to
wait for Godot, even as we feel the heavy pain of resonance in our own lives, waiting for what
we cannot be sure will come. The absence of divine presence in Beckett’s absurdist works flatly
insists that the world presents too much horror and incongruence to support the idea of a divine
structure. Such an intense absence should be particularly troublesome to a Christian audience—
Beckett’s denial of a divine presence is in many ways more complete and despairing than
existential or atheistic denial of divine presence. Nietzsche declares that God is dead; Beckett
shrugs and says the question of God’s life or death does not really matter. In a letter, Beckett
refers to this belief that the universe is cut off from a God, regardless of His existence of
nonexistence:
There is an end to the temptation of light, its polite scorching & considerations. It
is food for children and insects. There is an end of making up one’s mind, like a
pound of tea, an end of putting the butter of consciousness into opinions. The real
consciousness is the chaos, a grey commotion of mind, with no premises or
conclusions or problems or solutions or cases or judgments. (The Letters of
Samuel Beckett 546)
This chaos forms the basis of Beckett’s poetics. Humanity is unmoored from Christian
teleological understandings of the universe, and all that is left is the “grey commotion of the
7

Beckett denied ad infinitum that Godot represented God, but the nominal inclusion of a character who is viewed
as some type of savior by the play’s other characters but who never shows up has obvious religious connotations.
8
This includes not only a deity, but any concept of an afterlife or, even, a better life to ascend to.
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mind.” This commotion in Beckett’s work is not just internal. Language in Beckett is confused
and chaotic, and what might be termed the “excremental commotion” of Beckett’s characters
further reflects the fruitlessness of “premises or conclusions.”
A Christian understanding of Beckett’s work requires an analysis of what devices Beckett
uses to create a world void of divine presence. Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Julia Kristeva
complicate the relationship between the subject and the object, emphasizing the ultimately
unknowable nature of the other and, therefore, our inability to engage in relationship with the
other. Due to the Freudian psychology that represents the central methodology connecting my
critical lenses, I will be employing a predominantly psychoanalytic approach. Freud’s
descriptions of the ego, the id, and the super-ego and their associated functions in moderating
conscious, unconscious, and pre-conscious desires informs my analysis of Beckett’s characters
as compromised beings. The failures in their excretory functions bespeak a larger breakdown in
the boundaries between the inner and outer self.
Lacan’s language studies connect the logorrhea of Beckett’s characters to the failures in
their excretory functions. In Lacanian theory, the subject defines itself according to objects.
Lacan’s mirror stage of development describes the moment when the subject comprehends its
own image as object, something distinct from its ego. The dissonance between the subject as
subject and the subject as object is further complicated by the relationship between the signifier
and the signified. The signifier is not a constant feature in Lacanian theory, but is instead a
composed of a wealth of signifiers that give way to one another in turn. Meaning in language is
not fixed, but is ambiguous by its nature. Lacan argues that the unconscious is structured like
language and, therefore, is subject to the same ambiguity as language. A subject needs an object
in order to define itself. Because Beckett’s characters are compromised containers, they suffer
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dissolution of the boundaries between subject and object and are therefore unable to define
themselves.
Kristeva uses the term “abject” to describe the space beyond Lacan’s relationship
between subject and object. The abject is an absence instead of a presence and, in this way,
constitutes a liminal space. The abject is necessarily repressed, particularly in a scatological
sense, in order to prevent the horror and nausea of a breakdown between subject and object. The
scatological images in Beckett foreground the abject by depicting a breakdown of the borders
that shore up the self.
Such an understanding of the self as indefinable and unknowable frustrates a Christian
understanding of the Incarnation (a divine Other permanently taking on human flesh in order to
reconcile humanity to Himself). If Beckett’s characters are unable to know themselves, they are
unable to interact with other beings in a way that conclusively assures the transmission of
meaning and mutual understanding. God’s embodiment in human form for the purpose of
interacting personally with humanity is meaningless if humanity lacks the ability to interact with
Him. The scatological elements in Beckett’s work force Beckett’s characters into a world of
eternal liminal space. The breakdown of their excremental functions indicates the ill-defined
natures of their selves. This lack of self-definition prevents Beckett’s characters from
aggregating into a social order or into a larger symbolic order; an order relies on defined, discrete
components that it organizes. Beckett’s characters cannot achieve resolution to their stories.
There is only the endless threshold where everything is held unwaveringly until it produces
horror.

Bradford 17
Chapter Two: Beckett and Freud: Excrement, Repression, and Denied Endings
In Act 1 of Waiting For Godot, Vladimir and Estragon lay one of their frequent
arguments to rest by embracing, but the embrace is cut short by Estragon: “You stink of garlic!”
he accuses Vladimir (18). Vladimir explains that the garlic is “for the kidneys” (18), whose
condition causes him to frequently flee the scene in order to urinate. Later, Vladimir calls
Lucky's forced, joyless dance “The Hard Stool” (39), a double entendre that references one of
Pozzo's many possessions that Lucky is forced to carry, as well as constipation. Pozzo assures
Vladimir and Estragon that Lucky “used to dance the farandole, the fling, the brawl, the jig, the
fandango, and even the hornpipe. He capered. For joy. Now that's the best that he can do” (39).
Lucky's lackluster dance bespeaks restricted motion, much like someone who is “stopped up.”
When Lucky erupts into speech, the nonsensical deluge that pours forth recalls nothing so much
as diarrhea.
Beckett’s characters are constantly trapped in a losing battle with their excretory
functions. Attempts at repression are confounded by the body’s recurrent excremental failures.
Beckett’s characters experience isolation from others due in part to their socially unacceptable
excremental situations; however, the untimely appearance of excrement points to a deeper
isolation in Beckett’s characters. What should be contained within the body never stays
completely contained,9 pointing to a failure in one of the body’s primary functions: the
separation of what is inside from what is outside. Vladimir’s kidneys fail him, causing him to run
to the wings to relieve himself; Lucky’s enforced silence erupts into uncontrolled, disturbed
ranting. Bladders fail; long periods of silence are broken by nonsensical diatribes—the
aforementioned logorrhea that turns these characters into, in the words of Liz Barry, “leaky and

9

Even in Beckett’s works that lack incontinent characters
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uncertain containers” (38). Both actual excrement and the profusion of useless language point to
cracks in their containers.
Barry derives this concept of body as container from Mark Johnson who, in his book The
Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding, explores the concept of the body as a
discrete entity with an interior and an exterior defined by a boundary. He describes how objects10
move “from the exterior of a container across or through its boundary, finally coming to rest in
its interior” (138). The body’s ability to define the world by separating it into internal and
external categories is essential to the biological functions. Johnson notes this to be true of mental
functions as well: he argues that “‘body’ and ‘mind’ are not two separate things, but rather are
abstractions from our ongoing continuous, interactive experience” (140). The “container” that
Johnson is describing encompasses both biological and mental functions.
When a body becomes a leaky container, it is no longer discrete and, as a compromised
entity, is unable to locate itself in the surrounding world. Barry states that this breakdown of
bodies as containers “seems to expose a situation, familiar to modern thought but devastating in
its implications for Beckett’s isolated character, in which it is not an immediate and direct
understanding of the world that allows us to interpret it, but instead the correct affiliation to the
prevailing customs of interpretation” (32). The universe that Beckett creates in his works has no
comprehensible framework to guide his characters’ understanding of this universe. Instead, his
characters are uncertain of their place in this universe, unable to orient themselves in a society
from which they have been excluded. Barry states that “[p]hysical incontinence correspondingly
becomes a sign of the failure of this container and a profound indication of marginalization”
(35). The failure of the body as a container is a failure of biology, propriety, and the ability to

10

Here, “objects” refers to literal objects such as food that passes from the exterior into the interior of the body,
but also encompasses the transmission of language and, therefore, communication.
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locate oneself in a social structure. His characters’ inability to incorporate themselves into
whatever mode of society exists in a given work reflects their own internally compromised
states.
This definition of the body as an inside and an outside with a boundary between the two
recalls Turner’s definition of liminal space as comprised of three distinct segments: separation,
margin (liminal space), and aggregation. Separation and aggregation are only possible when
clear boundaries exist. The breakdown of clear boundaries between the inner and outer selves of
Beckett’s characters—as implied by their break with society—indicates the breakdown in the
process of clear separation and aggregation. Barry argues that Beckett’s characters are social
outcasts because of a fundamental collapse in their identities:
[T]he extreme of individuality that comes from being outside social habits goes so
far in Beckett’s characters as to constitute the lack of any perceptible boundaries
of self. The taboos are no longer in place that would protect the body from its
‘other,’ that is, from the waste products that are evidence of its fearful interior and
its own incipient mortality, its capacity to become itself waste . . . What seem
initially to be simple bad habits in fact point towards a collapse of identity itself.
(36-7)
Beckett’s characters cannot aggregate into society because they have suffered a collapse of their
own identities, rendering them unable to interact meaningfully with other beings. Rubin
Rabinovitz states, “The self for Beckett’s narrators often is a membrane-like divider that
separates physical and mental reality and sometimes permits objects to slip from one realm into
the other” (40). A “membrane-like divider” is not truly a divider at all, but a thin, futile attempt
at organizing the self into discrete categories. Physical and mental realities are not stable for
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Beckett’s narrators due to the lack of established boundaries. To be located within a system, an
object must itself have defined boundaries. Because Beckett’s characters are themselves not
discrete beings, they cannot locate themselves in the surrounding universe, and are therefore
unable to find resolution in their narratives.
Beckett’s characters are leaky containers in both their language and their uncontrolled
excretory functions. Vladimir is on a constant quest to repress his erratic bladder that threatens to
betray him. Lucky is a visibly repressed being, burdened by Pozzo's belongings and beaten at
Pozzo's whim. When the slightest opening is presented for Lucky to speak for himself, the words
that pour forth are unstoppable flood of meaningless language, useless and foreign in the way
that the words proceed from the subject with no apparent control or direction. Beckett’s use of
ambiguous, circular language has long been a major component of critical understanding of his
absurdist technique—the profusion of language such as Lucky’s speech exists to emphasize the
limitations of language. In this way, language and excrement are comparable: both are
irrepressible functions that accumulate no meaning even as they pile up.
Language stripped of its ability to communicate is mere waste, no better than the
excrement that abounds in Beckett’s work. Beckett strips language of its significance in order to
isolate his characters. Just as their uncontrolled excretory functions alienate them from society,
their nonsensical language negates their attempts at communication and meaningful connection
with other characters. Beckett titled one of his collections of short fiction Fizzles, a word without
obvious connotations in English, but the work’s French title, Foirades, can be translated loosely
to mean “wet farts.” The title intimates the existential difficulty of the creative process when
language dissolves into meaninglessness—the joke is that short pieces that comprise the
collection may as well be a crass explosion of gas for all the meaning they can truly contain or
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express.
Comparing language to mere flatulence complicates a Christian understanding of
language as God-given. In Christian tradition, speech is what sets humans apart from animals,
one of the defining elements of being made in the image of God.11 A fart superficially mimics the
form of speech—air audibly leaving the body—but is literally an inversion of speech in that it
comes from the opposite end of the body with none of the communicable meaning. In his essay
“Beckett’s Atmospheres,” Steven Connor discusses the significance of farts in Beckett as “an
example of bodily quasi-speech, an inversion of the logos, or breath of God” (61). Connor
references the Catholic practice of sufflation in which a priest blesses something by blowing on
it. Farting perverts this holy breath and also makes a mockery of the significance of language. A
fart is soundless speech, air leaving the body in a truly wordless, meaningless fashion. It
resembles the spoken word without fulfilling its communicative function. Throughout Beckett’s
work, excremental functions provide an image that captures the fruitlessness of all
communication. Meaningless language and excrement alike burst forth at inopportune moments
despite Beckett’s characters’ attempts at repression.
The idea of repression features famously in the work of Sigmund Freud. By interpreting
dreams, linguistic free associations, and the potentially hidden impulses from which they arise,
Freud laid the foundation for the field of psychoanalysis. Freud divides the mind into conscious
and unconscious zones, but notes that “a state of consciousness is characteristically very
transitory” (The Ego and the Id 2). An idea can be latent—currently unconscious but capable of
becoming conscious. Latency complicates the conscious/unconscious binary by creating two
types of unconscious states—“the one which is latent but capable of becoming conscious, and
the one which is repressed and which is not, in itself and without more ado, capable of becoming
11
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conscious” (2). Therefore, a third designation must be made between conscious and unconscious:
the preconscious. The preconscious idea, the state of latency, exists because potentially conscious
ideas are being repressed.
This repression stems from the operations of the super-ego, one of the three categories of
the mind that govern mental activity. In An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, Freud specifies the
nature of these three categories. The id is the home of unconscious impulses. The id “expresses
the true purpose of the individual organism’s life,” seeking to satisfy “its innate needs” (5)—
these needs, much like the id’s impulses to satisfy them, are not generally consciously
acknowledged. The super-ego consciously evaluates the social and moral implications of the id’s
impulses, while the ego moderates between the super-ego and the id. Freud explains, “Conflicts
between the ego and the ideal will [the super-ego], as we are now prepared to find, ultimately
reflect the contrast between what is real and what is psychical, between the external world and
the internal world” (The Ego and the Id 26). The goal of these mental drives is to distinguish the
internal (mental) life from the external world. When the ego becomes aware of impulses that are
socially unacceptable,12 “it either acquiesces in them or tries to fend them off by the process of
repression” (19). An inability to repress the activity of the id results in socially unacceptable
behaviors that ultimately ostracize and isolate.
Beckett’s characters’ inability to control their excretory functions prefigures their
inability to repress the activity of the id; their inability to moderate these functions literally
prevents these characters from entering into society and indicates their ultimate isolation. Again,
this excrement provides a parallel to Beckett’s empty language that seems to stem from
characters’ unfiltered id. In his essay “Beckett and Freud,” Raymond T. Riva compares Beckett’s
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“essentially symbolic language, one which is quite capable of communication while seeming to
say nothing and of going nowhere” to “the language of our repressed and sublimated selves; the
not-yet-civilized children we once were, and yet are in our unconscious id” (121-22). Beckett’s
characters speak from their unrepressed id, pouring forth empty words in the same way that they
fail to repress excremental functions, each of which isolates them from society.
The perpetual deferral of the death desire is symbolized by Beckett’s characters’
relationship with excrement and their perverted digestive temperament that refuses them the
normal incorporation of nourishment. Freud’s description of the death desire includes a
description of how eating requires the destruction—death—of an object before nourishment can
be incorporated, but Beckett’s characters are unable to incorporate food in the normal way. As
compromised containers, they do not have a firm boundary through which object—food—
becomes subject—nourishment. The digestive process is described as a cycle as endless and
fruitless as Beckett’s stories with their endlessly deferred endings, or the system of language
itself. In Malone Dies, Malone expresses the whole of existence as far as he is concerned: “What
matters is to eat and excrete. Dish and pot, dish and pot, these are the poles” (179). There is
nothing to existence but the endless repetition of eating and excreting. This digestive process is
marked by its two opposing terms—eating and excreting—but the process itself is always liminal
in nature. While within the human body, the food being digested is neither object nor subject. Its
progress through the body resembles Turner’s description of the “passage from lower to higher
status” as “through a limbo of statuslessness [limen]. In such a process, the opposites, as it were,
constitute one another and are mutually indispensable” (361). Turner’s concept of aggregation
(here: “higher status”) is, of course, ultimately unrealizable for Beckett’s compromised
characters. Instead, the liminal space between these two poles characterizes the space between
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dish and pot.
Freud states that “the act of eating is a destruction of the object with the final aim of
incorporating it” (6), but Beckett’s compromised characters either lack anything of substance to
incorporate or, through their uncontrollable excremental functions, seem unable to incorporate
what is available to them. Molloy has a fixation with sixteen stones that he derives a kind of
childish, Freudian pleasure in sucking, but Riva believes that this fixation goes beyond Freudian
desires and indicates “a desire (or even a subconscious attempt) to regress further, to total nonbeing . . . [b]y sucking inanimate objects, perhaps, I may come to resemble them” (124). Riva
sees Molloy’s sucking stones as a “totally unconscious and equally unknowable desire to return
to an inorganic state” (124); Molloy describes how the stone “appeases, sooths, makes you forget
your hunger, forget your thirst” (Three Novels 22). Beckett’s characters are unable to incorporate
nourishment and, in many cases, seek oblivion as the answer to their insatiable hunger.
Excremental functions, as a parallel to the hollowness of language, reflect this
malnourished situation. Barry addresses the narrator in The Unnamable whose “mouth may be
described as ‘speech-parched,’ never having enough, but he envisages a time when he might let it
fill with ‘spittle’ (Trilogy, 32), an ‘empty’ substance that might replace the vomit of social
discourse. Ultimately this too gives way to the ‘odourless wind’ of a body that is emptied, that
feeds only on itself” (39). The body, deprived of nourishment, begins to feed on itself, producing
farts like so much useless language. As compromised containers, Beckett’s characters fail to
incorporate nourishment internally just as they fail to be incorporated into a macrocosmic
structure. Both of these failures of incorporation are given form through excrement and
excremental functions: farts replace speech, urination is painful and no longer under the
character’s control, and shit accumulates in place of meaning. Beckett’s characters seek to escape
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their hunger through a return to inorganic material, but their compromised containers collapse in
on themselves, trapping them in liminal space.
One of Beckett’s leakiest and most uncertain containers is the main character of “The
Expelled.” Beckett originally wrote this work in French and later translated it into English. Linda
Collinge-Germain discusses the significance of the work’s original French title: “The title of the
story ‘L’expulse’ conjures up notions of exclusion, uprooting and even more archaically, of
birthing. It implicitly suggests two territories, one to exit and one to enter into. The space
between two such territories is a ‘discomfort zone’ in its lack of landmarks” (2).13 “The
Expelled” is a noun phrase with two meanings that reinforce one another: “The Expelled” refers
to both the narrator himself and the excrement that his body involuntarily expels. Both the
narrator and his bodily waste find themselves in a place between residences, somewhere beyond
separation without the possibility of aggregation. The title indicates a being ejected from his
previous state of existence, one who has not yet arrived at another definite state of being—
existing only in liminal space.
The story opens with the unceremonious ejection of the unnamed narrator, leaving him
firmly outside any place of residence, and ends with the narrator still unsure of his location.
Lying on the sidewalk, he looks back at the door that characterizes the home he left as a kind of
womb. The door is green, an obvious symbol of new life, but it also has a series of vaginal
characteristics: “a hole . . . and a slit for letters, this latter closed to dust, flies and tits by a brass
flap fitted with springs” (Stories and Texts for Nothing 12). The ejection from the home is, in a
sense, the narrator’s first true birth because the town—what he calls “the scene of my birth”
(13)—is foreign to him. Although he says that “[n]ow and then I would go to the window, part
the curtains and look out,” he always “hastened back to the depths of the room, where the bed
13
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was” (13). However, that return to the interior is now impossible. The interior of the house was a
kind of womb in which he refused separation, but to which, once ejected, he cannot return.
After separating from the home, the narrator’s journey is aimless and provides no hope of
a conclusion: he will not find a way to assimilate back into society nor encounter a place to rest.
His journey is denied any form of aggregation. At the story’s close, he extricates himself from
the cab in which he attempts to sleep14 and heads toward the rising sun, realizing, “I did not
know where I was” (Stories and Texts for Nothing 25). His is unable to locate himself, either
literally or existentially. He says, “I would have liked a sea horizon, or a desert one,” but instead
defines his days by acknowledging their purposeless wandering: “When I am abroad in the
evening, I go to meet the sun, and in the evening, when I am abroad, I follow it, till I am down
among the dead” (25). While the narrator may be implying that he may join the dead, his
uncertain location—in other words, his liminal existence—and his aimless “journey” indicate
that he will not himself find his own resting place. If he walks toward the sun when it rises, at
noon the sun will peak and then begin to descend and he must follow the sun back the way he
came. The path he describes will never lead anywhere, much less down to the dead, but will
instead occupy him in an uncomfortable, endless “journey” back and forth over the same patch
of earth. His circumstance, trapped on the threshold between uncertain origins and an uncertain
destination, is the liminal existence that most of Beckett’s characters find themselves trapped in.
The narrator’s liminal existence, trapped between separation and aggregation, is seen not
merely in the endless journey, but also in the eternal drip down his leg. The narrator recounts the
nature of his affliction: “I had then the deplorable habit, having pissed in my trousers, or shat
there, which I did fairly regularly early in the morning, about ten or half past ten, of persisting in
going on and finishing my day as if nothing had happened . . . till bedtime I dragged on with
14
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burning and stinking between my little thighs, or sticking to my bottom, the result of my
incontinence” (14). This incontinence produced in him a peculiar, wide-legged gait that he
thought would “put people off the scent” (14), both figuratively and literally, but of course did
neither. The narrator is aware of his filth—he knows that shortly after ejecting him from the
home, the inhabitants would “close the window, draw the curtains and spray the whole place
with disinfectant” (12). He here implies that those who forcibly removed him from the home (of
which we know little besides its nature as a place of residence wherein the narrator is
unwelcome) have rejected him at least in part due to this filth.
His rejection from society due to his uncontrolled excretory functions reflects his own
identity as a compromised container, unable to assimilate because he himself is not a discrete
entity. His inability to locate himself in the world around him recalls Barry’s insistence that
Beckett’s characters cannot interpret the world as it appears but must base their interpretations on
“correct affiliation to the prevailing customs of interpretation” (32). In “The Expelled,” the
narrator is not only symbolically removed from society in the opening lines, but is rejected as a
possible member of society throughout. He walks down the street because he states, “The widest
sidewalk is never wide enough for me” (15). His peculiar gait, stemming from his incontinence,
does not fit within socially designated boundaries. A policeman orders him to walk on the
sidewalk and then, after many near accidents with other pedestrians, another policeman orders
him back off the sidewalk, stating that “the sidewalk is for everyone” (16). The narrator realizes
that “it was quite obvious that [he] could not be assimilated to that category” (16). The curb
forms a social boundary that creates two categories: on the sidewalk and off of the sidewalk.
Cars belong in the street and pedestrians—“everyone”—belongs on the sidewalk. Because the
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narrator does not belong on either side of this barrier, he is trapped in the liminal, transitory
space between socially designated categories—in other words, no place at all.
The narrator raises his eyes “to the sky, whence cometh our help . . . where you wander
freely, as in a desert” but concludes that such searching “gets monotonous in the end” (13).
Scanning the heavens for a sign of respite is fruitless and, in the end, exactly as monotonous as
the aimless journey with one’s gaze focused down on the earth. Even the endless expanse of the
heavens provides only the promise of aimless wandering through a desert that recalls both the
plight of the Israelites, punished by their God to remain nomads in the desert for forty years, and
the narrator’s own circular journey from sunrise to sunset. Paul Davies refers to this isolation
even in nature as “abstraction from the biosphere,” which he claims is a kind of hell for Beckett’s
characters (76).15 Society does not provide a residence for Beckett’s characters, but there is no
solace in nature, either. There is no home in the sky for the narrator of “The Expelled”; there is
no home at all for him. Barry argues that the narrator “is uncouth in terms of social behaviour,
but further than this, the very language of everyday living throws him out, unable to assimilate
him to its categories. His uncouthness, as the etymology of the term suggests, renders him
unknowable and monstrous” (36). He is unable to assimilate into society due to his grossly
compromised container of a body, no longer a discrete entity but a fundamentally compromised
being. His desire for death is thwarted and he cannot even reincorporate back into inorganic
material. He is horrifically, eternally trapped in liminal space.
Although Beckett’s compromised characters are denied a place of residence and,
therefore, an opportunity for aggregation, the Freudian death desire momentarily appears to
present a hope of resolution; oblivion does not require incorporation into a social structure.
However, Beckett denies his characters death, denies endings to their stories, and keeps them
15
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trapped in liminal space without end. Victor Turner states that when a subject reaches the
consummate state of aggregation, “[t]he ritual subject . . . is in a relatively stable state once more
and, by virtue of this, has rights and obligations vis-à-vis others of a clearly defined and
‘structural’ type; he is expected to behave in accordance with certain customary norms and
ethical standards binding on incumbents of social position in a system of such positions” (The
Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure 349). We have seen that Beckett’s characters never
enter into a relationship with society that involves clearly defined rights and obligations.
However, Freud’s discussion of the interaction between the love instinct—Eros—and the death
desire seems to provide a hope for a reincorporation of a sort. Freud states that “[t]he aim of the
first of these basic instincts [Eros] is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus—
in short, to bind together; the aim of the second, on the contrary, is to undo connections and so to
destroy things . . . the final aim of the destructive instinct is to reduce living things to an
inorganic state” (An Outline of Psycho-Analysis 6, emphasis added). The death instinct, by
forming an oppositional mirror image of the love instinct, presents a possibility for a kind of
reincorporation: a return to “an inorganic state,” the state before ejection from the womb, a state
of rest in death.
The potential for rest through a return to an inorganic state, however, is an illusion.
Beckett denies his characters endings through the circular plot structures. Stories often end
exactly where they began, in the same physical location with the characters in the same situation
they were in at the story’s beginning. Act I of Waiting for Godot ends with Vladimir and
Estragon talking to a boy about Godot’s return; after another full day of waiting, Act II ends with
an almost identical conversation. Both times, the act closes with the stage direction, “They do not
move” (52, 88). Nothing has changed, and nothing will change. They are fixed to a place of
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hopelessness from which they are unable to move. Endgame lowers its curtain on Hamm who
“remains motionless” (134). The Unnamable ends with the declaration that continued motion in
this circular system is both impossible and inevitable: “you must go on, I can’t go on, I’ll go on”
(407). In the radio play Embers, Henry expresses frustration at his wife’s tendency to not
complete her thoughts. He says, “Drive on, drive on! Why do people always stop in the middle
of what they are saying?” (102). He does not receive an answer because there is no end to drive
on to. His wife, like many of Beckett’s characters, stops speaking because she realizes the futility
in continued speech. They will only continue to circle, unable to escape their absurd situation.
Beckett’s characters long for an ending to this cycle but such an ending never arrives.
Few of Beckett’s characters actually ever die. Riva argues that Vladimir and Estragon are, in
fact, waiting for death, but a death that will not come: “The white-bearded Godot who never
arrives seems to be the very fact of death itself; always awaited with a certain amount of
anticipation, yet never quite arriving” (125). From within their grey, bare room, Hamm states,
“Outside of here it’s death” (Endgame 96); however, neither he nor Clov definitely leaves the
house. At the play’s end, Hamm sits alone in the room and says to the empty room, “Moments
for nothing, now as always, time was never and time is over, reckoning closed and story ended”
(133). The story, however, is not over, despite what Hamm says. The audience (like Hamm) does
not know if Clov has left or is merely in the other room, and Hamm is not dead nor changed, he
merely remains.16 Molloy refers to decomposition as “tranquility” (Three Novels 21), or a kind of
peace that he is unable to find in life. However, he admits, “To decompose is to live too, I know,
I know, don’t torment me, but one sometimes forgets” (22). Molloy expresses how the living and
dying are similar in their entropic nature, but the decomposition of life is what Connor calls “a
16
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Beckettian pattern of ‘leastening’ or progressive diminishment,” which results not in aggregation
but, instead, “a deferral of ending” (128).17 Death will not arrive for Beckett’s characters.18
Beckett’s use of excrement forces this deferral of endings to the center of his work
because the excremental process is, like Beckett’s absurd universe, liminal in nature. Paul
Sheehan argues that “Beckettian space is liminal space, the difference between self and unself.
Beckett’s thresholds are not access points or any other marker of transience. They are rather nonspaces of attempted habitation, sites of enforced residence . . . they signify the step not beyond.
The invitation to cross the lower limit implied by a threshold is revoked” (185). Beckett’s
characters take up an enforced residence in the threshold of liminal space and are denied the step
through the threshold into the next stage. Ronald R. Thomas19 states that “Beckett’s hapless
travelers” are on a journey that “keeps circling back upon itself and beginning again, extending
the end of the line a little further” (386). It is in this endless deferral of endings that Beckett
denies his characters even the reincorporation of the body into inorganic material.
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Chapter Three: Beckett and Lacan: The Other and the Receding Signified
The bilingualism of Samuel Beckett’s work plays a central role in how we are to interpret
his use of fragmented language, and how that language depicts Beckett’s characters as broken
containers. Beckett’s oeuvre has a diverse origin story. As a native Irishman, he began writing
and publishing in English, but by the time he was producing many of his most famous works, he
was living in Paris and writing his works first in French before translating them back into
English. Some critics place the impetus for the shift of language in the influence of his friend
James Joyce and Beckett’s fear that he might never write himself out from under that influence.
In Dream of Fair to Middling Women, Belacqua muses tellingly, “Perhaps only the French
language can give you what you want” (48). Purportedly, Beckett’s reason for shifting from
English to French was to write without the wealth of connotations inherent in writing in one’s
native tongue. By using French rather than the language he grew up using, Beckett was able to
approach the language as a tool to be used for his art rather than an unconscious tool used
automatically in all communication. By the twilight of Beckett’s career, he was once again
writing and producing in English, but still translating his works into French. This bilingualism is
an essential component of Beckett’s catalog—his works exist in both languages, not just for his
readers, but for himself as translator. By using both languages, Beckett demonstrates his
fundamental belief in the nature of language as unfixed, dependent on context, association, and
personal interpretation, and therefore fundamentally compromised.
In his essay on Beckett’s bilingualism, Lance St. John Butler argues that Beckett’s
translation of his own work is further proof of the “radical incommensurability of languages”
(115). Although Beckett translated his own works between French and English, he took such
liberties with lexical and grammatical nuances that the translation is liberal rather than exact.
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However, Beckett’s own playfulness with language is not the source of this incommensurability
according to Butler. Instead, Butler says, “Beckett merely points up, in his attempt at the
impossibility that is translation, the impossibility of all communication, and if his texts in
different languages differ it is, paradoxically, because only by differing can they hope to be at all
the same” (116). Beckett shows us something by utilizing both English and French, beyond the
evolution of his style. He makes additional adjustments to the language beyond what a strict
translation would require, emphasizing the essential gap between English and French. These
quirks in translation suggest that this gap is present in all communication, not just that from the
one that opens up between one language and another. By translating his works between French
and English, Beckett demonstrates one of his own fundamental principles: the impotence of
language.
Raymond Federman, a friend of Beckett’s and author of many articles about Beckett’s
use of language, cites one of Beckett’s favorite quotes that Federman believes defines Beckett’s
poetic. St. Augustine’s declaration, “Do not despair, one of the thieves was saved, Do not
presume, one of the thieves was damned” fascinated Beckett. In a lecture later published as “The
Imaginary Museum of Samuel Beckett,” Federman says, “Beckett said to me: It is not the
meaning of this sentence that interests me, it is its shape, its movement. It has perfect symmetry,
the way it cancels itself. And suddenly I realized that it was not the meaning of words that really
concerned Beckett, but the shape of language” (160). Beckett’s interest in language stemmed less
from its ability to communicate but, in fact, the opposite: language’s ability to make a pleasing
shape that does not intend to communicate.20 Federman points to the postscript affixed to the end
of Watt, “No symbols where none intended” (qtd. in Federman 156), as further evidence of his
20
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view. Federman wryly suggests that Beckett does not imply symbol anywhere, and rather is
playing with the shape of language.
Butler is suspicious of such attempts to define a driving poetic for Beckett’s work.
Federman states that the “aim of such a study would be not merely to note differences or
variants, but to arrive at an aesthetic of bilingualism or self-translating, or better yet to arrive at a
poetics of such activity” (qtd. in Butler 116). Butler believes such a study is, at best, limited
because “[t]he notion of ‘arriving’ hardly seems possible any longer” (116). Butler sneers at an
attempt to pin down and dissect Beckett’s style in order to find its central poetic. We arrive at a
fruitless circle: is Beckett’s constant subversion of meaning in itself his central claim? Is defining
a “central claim” a violation of Beckett’s approach? Butler argues the latter; Federman the
former. In either case, Beckett’s language is designed to frustrate, an obverse embarrassment of
riches that results in a dearth of meaning.
Language in Beckett is not fixed, but a fluid array of associations and wordplay that
seems to communicate less the more it accumulates. This uncertainty of language stems from the
unconscious mind and the desires and drives that originate out of it. The work of Jacques Lacan
takes Freud’s assertions regarding the unconscious mind, its associated desires, and applies these
ideas to semiotics and the nature of language. In The Four Fundamental Concepts of
Psychoanalysis, Lacan insists that “the unconscious is structured like a language” (20); although
a function of language like syntax is pre-conscious, “what eludes the subject is the fact that his
syntax is in relation with the unconscious reserve. When the subject tells his story, something
acts, in a latent way, that governs this syntax and makes it more and more condensed” (68).
Much of Freud’s work analyzes the mind’s tendency to condense, to link ideas despite gaps in
conscious understanding. The psycho-analytic practice of dream interpretation and associations
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relies on desires or behaviors standing in for previously unrealized connections within the mind.
Lacan compares this function of the mind to metonymy, a figure of speech that substitutes a
thing with a related thing—“Hollywood” standing in for “the film and entertainment industry,”
for example. The unconscious mind connects ideas in this way, relating one image to another
without a direct obvious link. The structure of language is thus essential to the functioning of the
unconscious.
Freud’s understanding of how the unconscious mind of the subject relates to objects
provides Lacan with a basis for providing language with agency. Lacan states, “Nature
provides—I must use the word—signifiers, and these signifiers organize human relations in a
creative way, providing them with structures and shaping them” (20). Signifiers as elements of
language shape the way in which a subject interprets his experience, and language is thus
essential to any understanding of experience. Language belongs to the symbolic order, separate
from Lacan’s idea of the real—raw, undifferentiated experience. Human relations are not merely
communicated in language, but shaped by language. In short: “Everything emerges from the
structure of the signifier” (Lacan 203). It is the interpretation and organization of events, not the
only events themselves, that characterizes human comprehension of experience. Similarly, the
definition of the self stems from “the dialectic of the advent of the subject to his own being in the
relation to the Other . . .the subject depends on the signifier and that the signifier is first of all in
the field of the Other” (205). In other words, a concept of the self relies on a concept of the
Other—the not-self. Self-definition in the conscious realm rests on the unconscious functioning
of the mind, a function tied up with structure of language.
As the primary device for self-definition and understanding the unconscious, language
presents numerous problems in the relationship between the subject and the signified. Lacan
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argues that the processes between the subject and the Other are not fixed, but circular. Because
“a signifier is that which represents a subject for another signifier” (207), the process of defining
the Other involves a reduction of external objects to signifiers: “The signifier, producing itself in
the field of the Other, makes manifest the subject of its signification. But it functions as signifier
only to reduce the subject in question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in
the same movement in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as a subject” (207).
Something that is Other—a foreign object—for the subject is its own subject, but must be
reduced to a signifier in order to relate the original subject. In this way, a subject must
experience the external world in a fundamentally personal way. Any manner of interpreting the
external world that relies on personal perception rather than external factors is necessarily
ambiguous.
Lacan distills this difficulty in defining the referents that constitute a signifier through the
image of a necklace linked through another necklace: a chain without conclusive end. Although
language indicates meaning, that meaning does not subsist in the language. Lacan references the
poetic nature of language and how this informs his chain: “What this structure of the signifying
chain discloses is the possibility I have, precisely in so far as I have this language in common
with other subjects, that is to say, in so far as it exists as a langue, to use it in order to signify
something quite other than what it says” (“The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious, or
Reason Since Freud” 155). Because language, through devices like metonymy, can signify a
multitude of things apart from what is literally referred to, the chain of signifiers turn language
from concrete representation into ambiguous references. Lacan states that “we can say that it is
in the chain of the signifier that the meaning ‘insists’ but that none of its elements ‘consists’ in
the signification of which it is at the moment capable,” and for this reason, “[w]e are forced,
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then, to accept the notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (160). The
chain of signifiers buries the signified, creating myriad complexities and gaps in language that
prevents the signifier from resolving. Because these signifiers do not resolve, language itself
constitutes a liminal space in which Beckett’s characters are trapped, unable to communicate
with one another or to adequately define themselves. If the unconscious is structured like
language, Lacan’s chain of signifiers presents both complications in language as communication
and language as the vehicle for defining the self. Beckett understood these fundamental
limitations of language and the problems these limitations present for his characters. Beckett’s
bilingualism represents a catholic hostility toward language that compares attempts at
communication to so much scat.
Linda Collinge-Germain argues that Beckett’s choice to write in a foreign language is an
essential component of his work. The foreignness of his language is a statement on the nature of
language itself. She states, “For Beckett, as several critics have remarked, choosing a foreign
language in which to write is a catalyst for a reflexion on the arbitrary nature of the sign, an
opportunity to explore more fully the notion of language, what it means to use language, to
communicate, to write a story” (Collinge-Germain 2). Beckett’s glib title Fizzles no longer seems
like a self-deprecating crudity, but a significant commentary on the difficulty in communicating
with such a broken vehicle as language. When language breaks down into a chain of more or less
arbitrary signifiers, communication resembles nothing so much as a wet fart, an empty echo in
liminal space.
The circularity of language in Beckett’s emphasizes the ambiguousness of language. His
writing is rife with puns and double entendres, repetition, and contradictory statements, expelling
a kind of waste that accumulates senselessly. The narrator in The Unnamable declares, “. . . shit,
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there we have it at last, there it is at last, the right word, one has only to seek, seek in vain, in
order to be sure of finding it in the end, it’s a question of elimination (359). The Unnamable, like
the rest of the trilogy, is comprised primarily of lengthy monologues. The narrator in The
Unnamable sifts through an abundance of language to find the right word, only to conclude that
the word he is searching for is “shit.” This sardonic declaration is an acceptance of the futility of
the task. In the end, language, like excrement, is expelled from the body as waste. Beckett
follows Lacan’s chain of signifiers and finds language itself lacking, insufficient for its purported
task.
This breakdown in the function of language leads to difficulties in defining the self,
another dilemma faced by Beckett’s characters as broken containers. Krapp’s Last Tape finds the
play’s main character reflecting on his life as it is documented in his tapes. Julie Campbell
examines the semantic resonances of the “crap” that we hear in Krapp’s name. The semantic
Krapp is connected to the Latin word “crapula,” and further with “crapulence,” or “gross
intemperance” (64). The Dutch word “krappe” means “to pluck off” or “to cut,” and the
antiquated French word “crappe” translates as “siftings”; both the French and the Dutch,
according to Campbell, refer to the end of Krapp’s life as he composes his last tape (63). A
sifting happens as Krapp replays his tapes. He is searching for something in his tapes, as
evidenced by his detailed ledgers of the tapes. Not only is he replaying them, creating an
interaction between his past self and his present self, but he is consulting ledgers that he made
after listening to these tapes at some intermediate period: three different Krappes are therefore
involved in this play at any given time. However, his repeated searches produce no returns. All
Krapp finds in his own words is waste to be discarded.
He replays his tapes, stopping them at intervals to interject his current perspective
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alongside the voice of his past issuing from the recorder. His reinterpretations emphasize the
mutability of language that stems from its ambiguous nature. He plays the tape that recounts a
physical encounter with a woman in a boat, and the images are sensual and meditative—his hand
on her breast as the water moved under the boat. Upon shutting the tape off, Krapp recalls his
youthful perspective: “Could have been happy with her, up there on the Baltic, and the pines, and
the dunes. (Pause.) Could I? (Pause.) And she? (Pause.) Pah! (Pause.) Fanny came in a couple
of times. Bony old ghost of a whore. Couldn't do much, but I suppose better than a kick in the
crutch” (222). Breasts and water, both images of life, have become the image of a bony old
ghost, a husk of what he once believed. Although the events remain the same, the language
Krapp uses to describe them changes, which reshapes that experience. The tape, played years
later, no longer communicates the same content.
Krapp’s fixation with the tapes, which he collects and fastidiously records in ledgers,
parallels the retentiveness of his own body’s constitution. This intemperance is manifested in
Krapp’s constipation. He refers to his own “[u]nattainable laxation” right after he notes his
“[f]lagging pursuit of happiness” (218). The two are connected for Krapp—the failure of his
excretory functions parallels not only his waning happiness, but his waning pursuit of happiness.
Much like laxation, happiness seems increasingly unattainable. As Krapp ages, his desire to
attempt to regulate both laxation and happiness fades because it becomes increasingly clear that
relief—in either sense—will not come. His first selected entry in his ledger refers to a “[s]light
improvement in bowel condition,” but when Krapp plays the tape in question, his 39 year old self
says, “Have just eaten I regret to say three bananas and only with difficulty restrained a fourth.
Fatal things for a man with my condition” (217). The bananas clearly exacerbate Krapp’s
digestive problems, but he is unable to resist, fixated as he is on the very object that feeds his
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problem.
Both the tapes and his constipation are images of waste that Krapp cannot let go of; the
comparison of the tapes to constipation connects language with excrement. On one hand, a spool
that contains Krapp’s recorded word, language; on the other, a banana that further complicates
Krapp’s digestive complaints. Campbell references the idea that spool “is a near homophone of
‘stool’” (69), drawing the two images even closer together. The tapes illustrate Krapp’s inability
to truly change (his sexual exploits as well as his banana obsession are documented consistently
across years of his life) and his inability to reconcile with the various versions of himself. Krapp
records these tapes, keeps ledgers of the information contained in the recordings, and continually
replays the tapes in an effort to draw something from them, but they provide him only with a
sense of alienation from his previous self. The language he now uses no longer resembles the
way he once spoke of events: the chain of signifiers that he attempts to exhaustively detail
through both the spoken and written word do not culminate in any understanding. Krapp is
unable to even know himself. Clinging to the tapes is merely a form of stockpiling waste. His
clogged bowels speak to this same intemperance.
Lacan discusses this fixation on objects as an element of Freudian psycho-sexual
development; an object, as it forms an Other to the subject, directs desire in the subject. Lacan
refers to “this privileged object” as “that object around which the drive moves . . . the objet a”
(257). The objet a represents the gaps in the subject’s attempts to assign itself a signifier.
Because the subject must also recognize itself as signifier, and because the signifier necessarily
includes an endless chain of signifiers, the objet a provides desire that allows the subject to
orient itself. Lacan states, “The objet a is something from which the subject, in order to
constitute itself, has separated itself off” (103). In Krapp’s case, his tapes represent parts of
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himself that he has separated off in order to orient and preserve his identity. This attempt is, of
course, futile.
Although Krapp is on his last tape, the play does not end with Krapp’s death or even the
click of the tape stopping its recording. The play’s final stage direction reads, “The tape runs on
in silence” (223). Krapp, like so many of Beckett’s characters, is denied an ending. His inability
to find resolution is not arbitrary, however; Lacan’s argument that the unconscious is structured
like language explains Krapp’s inability to accurately conceptualize himself. Krapp attempts to
define himself in relation to a unique Other: the previous versions of himself. As Lacan states,
the subject depends on the signifier. However, because these past versions of Krapp are
unknowable, this version of himself is subject to reinterpretation and even direct contradiction to
the elderly Krapp. He frequently begins to ask himself a question about his previous self, but
these musings are interrupted with a pause, a break where language ceases to be useful. Krapp
begins to muse but cuts himself off, leaving the thought unresolved and the question itself
uncertain: “Sometimes wondered in the night if a last effort mightn't—(Pause.)” (223). What
was once the subject, his own self, has become a chain of signifiers that points to various things
to the elderly Krapp but that ultimately only emphasize the gaps in Krapp’s own consciousness.
Krapp is not a leaky container but is nonetheless a broken one; his constipation points to a
breakdown in his excretory functions. He is unable to expel what rightly must be expelled and,
therefore, unable to achieve resolution.
His inability to define himself represents a breakdown of his inner and outer selves—
what he thinks and what he says. Krapp’s failed interpretations and, therefore, failed
reinterpretations of himself, presumably carried out repeatedly through his life, illustrate this
breakdown, forcing him to respond to his own recorded words as if addressing a separate being.
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He cannot coalesce these versions of himself into a clearly defined whole. In contrast, the
bananas have a clear distinction between their inside and outside—the peel. Krapp takes great
pleasure in the process of peeling the banana, even stroking it before peeling, but he immediately
discards the peel on the floor and, moments later, “He treads on skin, slips, nearly falls, recovers
himself, stoops and peers at skin and finally pushes it, still stooping, with his foot over the edge
of the stage into pit” (216). Presumably, this has happened before and will continue to happen.
The peel is something Krapp fails to recognize as signifying his own fractured relationship
between inner and outer selves—although the sign is there, he merely slips on it. Campbell
compares Krapp’s “sour cud and the iron stool” to Malone’s “dish and pot”: “[I]n Krapp these
poles . . . become ill-distinguished, reversed: the banana and the faecal ‘stick’ become a
composite symbol and as such interchangeable” (68). As Krapp stands motionless, banana in his
mouth, excruciatingly constipated, his digestive processes have, like so many of Beckett’s
characters, broken down. His body is not a discrete container but is a liminal space where food is
trapped and becomes waste. Although this production of waste is an essential function of all
bodies, Krapp’s inability to pass the waste reflects his entrapment within liminal space. His
body confounds its own essential functions.
Beckett’s characters are ultimately alienated from themselves. The breakdown of the
inner and outer selves, reflected in the breakdown in excremental functions and paralleled in the
limitations of language, prevents Beckett’s characters from extracting meaning from their
situations. In his article “Descartes, Lacan, and ‘Murphy,’” Thomas J. Cousineau states that the
assimilation into a social order is a form of Freud’s death desire:
The self . . . will harden its self-boundary by striving to become a self
recognizable within the social order. This description of the stages through which
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the self betrays its original limitlessness leads to a reformulation of the death
wish, which, according to Lacan, is fulfilled through those successive acts by
which the self sacrifices its subjectivity and achieves its own suicide through
identification with its image and conformity to desires emanating from the social
order. (227)
This assimilation into a social order necessitates a loss for Lacan, an alienation of the self from
the real. Cousineau states that Beckett’s characters, however, detach from the real but are unable
to assimilate into society, suffering a loss on both sides. They are trapped in between the two
poles. This inability to correctly perceive the self or to communicate with a larger social order
stems from the futility of self-definition when that definition relies solely on an unconscious
structured like language—a created order apart from the real. Beckett’s characters are again
trapped in liminal space, forced to use a system of language that fails to shore up boundaries
between the self and the other, but rather obfuscates meaning through a chain of signifiers. This
broken system of language is distinct from the normal function of language through its inability
to resolve or reach a satisfactory interpretation.
The inability of Beckett’s characters to define themselves according to the Other reaches
a poetic zenith in Murphy. Cousineau states, “Divorced from both the real, which precedes the
formation of individual identity, and from the symbolic, where identity is modified by the
mediation of language and the intersubjective experience which it permits, Murphy is alone with
his idea of himself, a phantasized image which he invites to share his solitude” (229). Murphy
believes himself to be a discrete body and mind, a subject with clear boundaries. Murphy
believes that “his mind was a closed system, subject to no principle of change but its own, selfsufficient and impermeable to the vicissitudes of the body” (109). Yet, as Lacan demonstrates by
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comparing the unconscious to ambiguous language, the mind is not a closed system, but one that
relies on a chain of associations to function. However, Murphy believes himself to be in full
control of his own being, having made clear distinctions between the body and mind, believing
his own perception of himself to be accurate.
Despite his confidence, Murphy himself knows that “his memory was so treacherous that
he did not dare” commit anything to memory (75). When he drinks his tea too hurriedly, he
erupts into uncontrollable belching (82). Both body and mind are compromised, but Murphy
persists in his belief that he is comprised of discrete systems. He even acknowledges his
confusion about the interaction between his body and mind:
Thus Murphy felt himself split in two, a body and a mind. They had intercourse
apparently, otherwise he could not have known that they had anything in common
. . . Perhaps there was, outside space and time, a non-mental non-physical Kick
from all eternity, dimly revealed to Murphy in its correlated modes of
consciousness and extension, the kick in intellectu and the kick in re. But where
then was the supreme Caress? (109)
Because Murphy finds no solace in idea of a consciousness outside of the split he has made
between his body and mind, he denies the existence of such a consciousness. Even outside of
space and time, Murphy astutely observes, there could be no supreme Caress.
Despite Murphy’s endeavors to conceive of himself as subject, his role as signifier in
community with others is constantly in question. He asks Celia a yes or no question, what he
refers to as “the eternal tautology” (41). She responds with yes, he with no, and it is unclear—as
with many conversations between Celia and Murphy—if they are actually addressing one
another. When pressed to describe Murphy, Celia replies, “Murphy is Murphy” (17). He lacks
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relation to the world around him and, therefore, does not fully reside in this world, but in liminal
space somewhere between his own mind and the external world. Murphy revels in his isolation,
finding his greatest peace by tying himself tightly to a chair and rocking back and forth in an
attempt to completely clear his mind—motion with no result, fully and only a body. This rocking
would produce “the freedom of that light and dark that did not clash, nor alternate, nor fade nor
lighten except to their communion” (9). Later, Murphy is described as having “perhaps the best
[night] since nights began so long ago to be bad, the reason being not so much that he had his
chair again as that the self whom he loved had the aspect . . . of a real alienation” (194). Murphy
takes pride in his isolation because existing in society requires an alienation of the self from the
real, a separation that Murphy would not accept.
By insisting that his mind and body are discrete categories that he is in control of,
Murphy perpetuates a kind of Cartesian dualism. Cousineau argues that the solace Murphy takes
in perceiving his body and mind as discrete containers is a mistake because Descartes assumes
“that the ‘I’ who thinks is primordial and underived, when in fact, if Lacan’s theory is correct, it
is, rather, the end-result of a process of alienation” (226). Murphy’s dichotomy of mind and body
ignores the unconscious mind, the structure that is shaped like language and, therefore, contains
cracks and gaps. Catherine Russell states, “Alienation, for Lacan, consists in the divided nature
of the subject who is ‘condemned’ to a displacement through discourse into the field of the
Other. Meaning is conditional on its being received or understood, and so the subject as signifier,
in order to represent itself, disappears as subject” (26). In order to represent itself in a symbolic
order, the subject must become signifier to communicate and, therefore, fades from the realm of
being. Lacan terms the fading of the subject “aphanisis,” arguing that a subject cannot
simultaneously occupy the realms of being and meaning (211). Because Murphy denies this
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divided nature, he must seek solace in his isolation, within his own mind, to preserve his ideals.
Cousineau says, “The abuse to which [the narrator] subjects Murphy serves as a vehicle through
which he registers his suspicion that, as attractive an option as Murphy’s retreat into his mental
world may be, it represents in some way a misconception of reality” (225). Murphy’s conception
of the discrete separation between his body and mind is a cruel joke, further emphasizing the
fundamentally broken barrier between the inner and outer selves as described by Lacan’s
aphanisis.
Murphy, like many of Beckett’s characters, assumes that incorporation into death will
provide the solace he seeks. When he rocks in his chair, his “breath was not perceptible” (2); as
Murphy retreats into his own body, he approaches a death-like state. He describes his infancy
only to return to the matter of death: “With what sorrow he recorded that of all the millions of
little larynges cursing in unison at that particular moment, the infant Murphy’s alone was off the
note. To go back no further than the vagitus. His rattle would make amends” (71). Murphy
believes that his death rattle will put the sour note right, that he will find harmony in the universe
through annihilation. And unlike most of Beckett’s characters, Murphy does indeed die.
However, the treatment of his ashes depicts the ultimate futility of Murphy’s desires. Cooper
throws the packet of Murphy’s ashes in a barroom brawl, and “[b]y closing time the body, mind
and soul of Murphy were freely distributed over the floor of the saloon” (275). Far from the
discrete containers Murphy believed his body and mind to be, they mingle in death along with
one ingredient that he never acknowledged: his soul. Although the soul is often referred to
sardonically in Beckett—what use is a soul in an absurd universe?—the soul here at least figures
the unacknowledged unconscious aspect of Murphy’s being. Murphy’s strict dichotomy of body
and mind neglects his unconscious being and, therefore, is a delusion rather than an accurate
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conception of his self. His remains come to their final rest in “the spit, the vomit” of the barroom
floor (275). And there we leave Murphy.
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Chapter Four: Beckett and Kristeva: “The Terror That Dissembles”
As described by Lacan, the subject—I—is defined in relation to the object—the Other.
The process of aphanisis, the fading of the subject in order to occupy the realm of meaning,
describes a liminal space between the realm of being and the realm of meaning. This process by
which the subject transitions to the realm of meaning requires the subject to represent itself as
Other—as object. Lacan defines the developmental stage in which the subject comes to identify
the self as object as well as subject as the mirror stage. This schism within the ego shapes the
subject’s relationship to objects and provides the foundation for the tension between the subject
as subject and the subject as object. When the subject recognizes its reflection as something other
than itself—an object—it recognizes that the self that others perceive is distinct from the ego. In
Lacanian theory, this separation of ideal self—ego—from the self that others perceive as object
creates a liminal space.
In The Powers of Horror, Julia Kristeva seeks to describe a liminal space found not in the
interaction between the subject and the object, but outside of both the subject and the object.
Kristeva describes another type of liminal space—the abject. She describes the abject as that
which exists outside of the interplay of subject and object:
When I am beset by abjection, the twisted braid of affects and thoughts I call by
such a name does not have, properly speaking, a definable object. The abject is
not an ob-ject facing me, which I name or imagine. Nor is it an ob-jest, an
otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a systematic quest of desire. What is abject is not
my correlative, which, providing me with someone or something else as support,
would allow me to be more or less detached and autonomous. The abject has only
one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I. (1)
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The abject complicates the relationship between subject and object by being neither subject nor
object—the abject is that which exists outside of the boundaries we have established in order to
define subject and object. The abject is not an object as we understand an object, a thing with
boundaries that gives it shape. The character of the object allows a subject to define itself in
opposition to the object. An object shores up the boundaries of the subject by figuring what the
subject is not. An object is not-subject in the same way that the subject is not-object. The abject
is neither.
Although Lacan’s chain of signifiers complicates the relationship between subject and
object by imbuing that relationship with ambiguity, Kristeva preemptively eliminates the
possibility that the abject exists within Lacan’s chain of signifiers. What Kristeva terms the “objest” parallels Lacan’s description of the chain of signifiers, but the ob-jest is distinct from the
abject. Lacan’s description of “an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (160) is
very much like the quality of the ob-jest that Kristeva calls “an otherness ceaselessly fleeing in a
systematic quest of desire” (1). Kristeva rejects this ceaseless fleeing as indicative of the abject
because this flight, much like the relationship of the signifier to the signified, still provides a
framework for existential location that shores up the boundaries between subject and object. The
relationship of the signifier to the subject, although a complex one, still allows the subject to
define itself in terms of the object. The I is not the Other, and vice versa. The Other may be
unknowable, but it still provides a frame of reference that defines the self according to
boundaries: what constitutes the subject and what does not. Even as the chain of signifiers
recedes into ambiguity—as demonstrated both in Beckett’s meaningless language and his
characters’ unstable states of mind that prevent the self from being fully knowable—it still serves
as an object that provides the self with a framework for definition.
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In a Lacanian understanding, the symbolic order is characterized by the object which
directs desire. The subject defines itself in terms of not-object, but seeks reconciliation with that
object. Lacan’s mirror, the distinction between the subject as subject and the subject as object,
provides a framework by which the subject defines itself. This distinction between the ego and
objects orients the subject in relation to these objects. We see this attempt to define the self in
opposition to objects in Krapp’s fascination with spools and ledgers. Lacan argues that “it is in
the object to which the opposition is applied in act . . . that we must designate the subject. To this
object we will later give the name it bears in the Lacanian algebra—the petit a” (Four
Fundamental Concepts 62). The petit a is that which the subject defines as being separate from
the self and, therefore, seeks to be reconciled with this object. However, Kristeva asserts that this
ordering of desire vis-a-vis objects is dissolved in the abject. The abject deconstructs the ego’s
ability to reconcile itself according to an Other:
And, as in jouissance where the object of desire, known as object a, bursts with
the shattered mirror where the ego gives up its image in order to contemplate
itself in the Other, there is nothing either objective or objectal to the abject. It is
simply a frontier, a repulsive gift that the Other, having become alter ego, drops
so that “I” does not disappear in it but finds, in that sublime alienation, a forfeited
existence. (Kristeva 9)
The abject does not direct desire but marks a space where desire fails. Without a functional
relationship between subject and object, the subject has nothing with which to orient itself. The
subject is not merely subsumed into a chain of signifiers in order to communicate meaning, as
Lacan suggest, but instead forfeits its own existence, alienated from the symbolic and social
orders alike.
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Thus, alienation is an essential element of the abject—that which exists outside of a
symbolic order. Kristeva defines symbolic order as “the dependence and articulation of the
speaking subject in the order of language, such as they appear diachronically in the advent of
each speaking being, and as analytic listening discovers them synchronically in the speech of
analysands” (67). The subject depends on the order of language for definition and expression; as
Lacan says, the unconscious is structured like a language. The abject confounds this relationship
between the subject and the order of language. Kristeva describes the abject as “a place where
meaning collapses” (2). She explains that the abject is not merely a void or a complete absence:
“[The abject is n]ot me. Not that. But not nothing, either. A ‘something’ that I do not recognize
as a thing. A weight of meaninglessness, about which there is nothing insignificant, and which
crushes me. On the edge of nonexistence and hallucination, of a reality that, if I acknowledge it,
annihilates me” (2). The abject is what has been separated from the symbolic order of subject
and object.
Beckett’s characters uniformly embody this alienation. The characters of Endgame are
claustrophobically trapped within a bleak house, cut off from the world around them. Even the
world outside promises no hope of renewal or change. Hamm suggests, “But beyond the hills?
Eh? Perhaps it’s still green. Eh?” (111). He continues to hold out hope for something beyond the
hills. He tells Clov, “Perhaps you won’t need to go very far,” but Clov only responds, “I can’t go
very far” (111). Hamm, trapped as he is within his chair, views Clov’s mobility as their last hope
of finding something green. Clov, however, knows better than to even embark upon such a quest:
there is nothing to be found. In Waiting for Godot, Vladimir and Estragon are forced to wait in a
nondescript, alien landscape where the hope of anyone’s arrival, much less Godot’s, seems
laughable. Murphy is radically excluded from all forms of community throughout Murphy. He is
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also alienated from himself, demonstrating yet another failure of the container. He responds to
the struggle of maintaining one’s self-conception in the face of abjection by “straining his eyes
for the speck that was he, digging in his heels against the immense pull skyward” (25). Murphy
tethers himself to his rocking chair in part because he is receding from himself—he is unable to
hold himself as a fixed being in his own mind. However, even this rocking fails to return him
“the brightness of the firmament”21 as he desires (14). He is obstructed at all attempts at
aggregation. He is trapped in abjection, unable to incorporate into the symbolic order and unable
to reconcile the disparate elements of his self. Murphy, like all of Beckett’s characters, is
fundamentally alienated.
The abject does not belong to Lacan’s understanding of a symbolic order because the
abject is, as Kristeva says, a “jettisoned object” which has been rejected from the symbolic order
(1). When acknowledged, the abject produces horror through its dissolution of the ordered
relationship between subject and object. Because the jettisoned object is an unnamable object, it
does not provide a way for the subject to orient itself but instead opens up a yawning lack of
meaning as it fractures the symbolic order. The abject, when experienced, produces horror and
revulsion due to the breach of the symbolic order. Kristeva describes the abject as “a terror that
dissembles” (4). The abject presents a lack of distinction between subject and object. When the
subject is stymied in its quest to separate from one order and aggregate into another, the resulting
entrapment in liminal space produces horror. The subject itself lacks a framework for selfdefinition. Kristeva states that “the non-constitution of the (outside) object as such renders
unstable the ego's identity, which could not be precisely established without having been
differentiated from an Other, from its object” (62). The ego—and, by extension, the conscious
21

“And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which were under the firmament from the waters which
were above the firmament: and it was so” (Genesis 1:7 King James Version). Murphy’s alienation extends to a
divine order; if such an order exists, Murphy is prevented from incorporating into it.
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self—is shaped by its relation to an Other, but the abject, as a jettisoned object, provides no such
differentiating framework. Kristeva states, “The abjection of self would be the culminating form
of that experience of the subject to which it is revealed that all its objects are based merely on the
inaugural loss that laid the foundations of its own being” (5). In the breakdown of subject and
object, the self is an unstable concept, no longer able to be certain of its relation to objects that
are not knowable. The abject signifies a border between a knowable order and that which lies
beyond: “a terror that dissembles.”
This terror dissembles the symbolic order, forcing Beckett’s characters into the threshold
of liminal space. In a Lacanian understanding, the subject’s desire for aggregation is driven by
objects that provide definition for the subject by opposing the subject. However, Beckett’s
characters are prevented from arriving at the structure that the relationship between subject and
object provides. According to Kristeva, abjection prevents the definition of the self that the
defined relationship between subject and object would provide. Rather than being directed into
aggregation by object desires, Beckett’s characters exist outside of the frameworks of the social
order due to their abjection. When these characters are forced to face this abjection, “it means
that there are lives not sustained by desire, as desire is always for objects. Such lives are based
on exclusion” (Kristeva 6). When the relationship between subject and object breaks down, the
subject is excluded from the social order.
Beckett’s outcasts, radically excluded from society by their dysfunctional excremental
functions, possess an existence based on exclusion, not the inclusion that comes with
aggregation. They stare into the abject, both drawn toward the annihilation that the abject
represents and repulsed by the horror that the abject holds. Kristeva states that, instead of
drawing the subject into assimilation with a social order, “the abject simultaneously beseeches
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and pulverizes the subject” (5). The abject dramatically beseeches and pulverizes the characters
in Endgame. These characters are some of Beckett’s most radically excluded: Hamm, Clov,
Nagg, and Nell are trapped within a small house, unable to go outside, uncertain if anyone else
besides them is still alive. The characters in Endgame are thus all trapped in abjection, a liminal
existence cut off from anything beyond their own bare room. Hamm tells Clov, “Outside of here
it’s death” (96), and that nature “has forgotten us” (97). When Clov looks through the telescope
at the barren world outside, he repeats “Zero . . . zero . . . zero” (106). Hamm and Clov are both
drawn to the world outside, but every fresh examination of the horizon shows another zero. The
outside world beseeches and pulverizes them, attracting them even as it dissolves their hope of
aggregation.
The abject alienates the characters of Endgame from the world outside their house, just as
it alienates these characters from a functional knowledge of themselves according to the
relationship between subject and object. The dissolution of the borders between subject and
object has alarming consequences for the subject’s relationship between the conscious and
unconscious mind. Lacan’s understanding of objects that shape desire is founded in a Freudian
conception of the unconscious where the ego moderates the impulses of the id. The id produces
impulses that, despite the subject’s lack of awareness of their origins, drive behavior—the son’s
desire to be reconciled to his mother after the separation of birth, for example. The ego
moderates these impulses in order to ensure the subject’s ability to assimilate into a social order,
repressing socially unacceptable impulses and making the subject aware of social taboos:
violations of the order. This violation presents itself most clearly as that which is “unclean.”
Rituals of excretion and elimination and incest are two traditionally “unclean” categories that
Kristeva discusses. Both excretion and incest are unclean (albeit in different ways) because they
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breach the social order. By defining what is unclean, the subject has a means by which it
preserves its assimilation to the social order. Ritual processes allow the subject to preserve these
boundaries, separating itself from the abject despite the contradictions present when the subject
necessarily encounters the abject.
Turner describes the ritual process as an essential component in locating oneself in a
social order. He states that “each individual’s life experience contains alternating exposure to
structure and communitas, and to states and transitions” (361). Using the study of indigenous
tribes as his framework, Turner argues that rites of passage—liminal experiences that mark the
stage between separation and aggregation—are essential components of placement within a
social order. Turner argues this process of passing from one state into another through rite “is
almost everywhere held to sacred or ‘holy,’ possibly because it transgresses and dissolves the
norms that govern structured and institutionalized relationships and accompanied by experiences
of unprecedented potency” (372). These rites of passage have sacred connotations because they
exist between or outside of established states, creating an otherworldly statelessness. The rites of
passage reinforce the states on either side of the passage—the existence of the passage holds the
two states together. They reinforce the social order, so when the completed passage through a
liminal rite is disrupted, the resulting dissonance is unholy, unsacred, and unclean.
For Kristeva, uncleanness presents a significant connection between the violation of the
social order and rituals of eliminating waste. She notes that “in a large number of rituals and
discourses involved in making up the sacred—notably those dealing with defilement and its
derivations in different religions—[there is] an attempt at coding the other taboo that the earliest
ethnologists and psychoanalysts viewed as presiding over social formations” (58). Kristeva
argues that uncleanness is a violation of both a sacred order and a social order. In primitive
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cultures, the two are not wholly distinct: the social order is intimately tied up with religious
practices. However, even in a more modern culture such as Beckett was writing in, “defilement”
violates both sacred and social orders. A rite of passage that ends not in aggregation but in
entrapment in liminal space is defiled, robbed of its ultimate purpose. The result of such
defilement is abjection, a state that defies the subject’s modes of framing existence and produces
terror and revulsion.
Where does the subject encounter the abject? Kristeva finds the uncleanness that violates
the ritual process in excrement. The presence of excrement creates complications in the
subject/object relationship. As long as excrement resides within the body, it is constituent with
the body, making up an element of the subject. Once it is expelled, it is object, other, and is no
longer recognized as ever having been an element of the self. Excrement fascinates and
repulses—it simultaneously “beseeches and pulverizes the subject” (Kristeva 5). The fascination
with excrement is particularly strong in childhood, as the young self learns to define itself in
terms of its own eliminative functions—Freud’s anal stage. The opening lines of Dream of Fair
to Middling Women find young Belacqua in a frenzy of youth, pedaling his bicycle “faster and
faster, his mouth ajar and his nostrils dilated” (1). In the midst of this childish joy, Belacqua
notes with pleasure “the black fat we rump of the hoss. Whip him up, vanman, flickem, flapem,
collop-wallop fat Sambo. Stiffly, like a perturbation of feathers, the tail arches for a gush of
mard. Ah . . . !” (1). Although the excrement in question is repulsive and would produce
revulsion if encountered at any close distance, the defecating horse fascinates young Belacqua;
the joy of riding his bicycle is not dampened by the sight, but possibly enhanced.
In “A Rump Sexuality,” Paul Stewart examines the numerous significant connections
between the defecating horse and Freudian sexuality. Stewart compares the image of the

Bradford 57
defecating horse to the childhood delusion of anal birth, or the belief that children are born from
the mother’s anus: “[T]he Freudian possibility of anal birth creates an analogy between
procreation and defecation which is itself suggestive of why reproductive sex is best avoided; not
only does birth entail one's first taste of the shit, but one is born as shit” (264). An infant
constitutes part of the mother’s body until the time comes for it to be excreted, at which point it
separates from the mother’s womb, passes through a liminal rite of passage, and aggregates into
the larger world as a distinct object. In this way, the birthing process parallels excretory
functions—an element of the subject is excreted and becomes object. The concept of anal birth is
a collusion of the two processes, fusing two parallel images into a single concept of the subject
as waste. The Freudian conception of anal birth takes the breakdown of the relationship between
the subject and the object and compares the subject to the waste it excretes. Belacqua’s
fascination with the defecating horse stems, according to Stewart, from the collusion of birth and
defecation—the human body as waste to be excreted.
Molloy, like Belacqua, is fixated both on bicycles22 and anal excretions. The delusion of
anal birth persists in Molloy, who reminisces on “her who brought me into the world, through the
hole in her arse if my memory is correct” (Three Novels 12). Molloy describes this as his “[f]irst
taste of the shit” (12). Presumably, he experiences this taste of shit for the rest of his life. Stewart
states that “the foetus and the child that is Molloy are both waste material to be flushed away and
both waste material which do not recommend repetition” (265). When the subject is faced with
the abject, it becomes unable to define itself according to aggregation into a symbolic order. It
becomes trapped in liminal space. Barry references the alienation of Beckett’s characters from
social structures, stating that “[t]he taboos are no longer in place that would protect the body
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Bicycles provide Stewart with ample grounds to discuss autoerotic pleasure and masturbation, which is also
another example of waste—fertile biological material that is not used for reproduction but merely discarded.
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from its ‘other,’ that is, from the waste products that are evidence of its fearful interior and its
own incipient mortality, its capacity to become itself waste” (36). Molloy is trapped in this
abjection. The breakdown of the relationship between subject and object as depicted by the
presence of waste symbolizes Molloy’s broken self. He is born as shit into shit, and he will
remain in the filth. He refers to his “arse-hole” as “the true portal of our being” because it
provides “a link between me and other excrement” (74). Molloy here recognizes himself as
waste, and the arse-hole forms the true portal of his being because it elucidates his absurd
relationship to his own waste. Molloy, like so many of Beckett’s characters, is a fundamentally
compromised container, lacking a suitable barrier between his inner and outer selves, between
his conscious mind and unconscious impulses. This failure is given form through his
misunderstanding of excretory functions and birth. The symbolic order has broken down,
entrapping Molloy in abjection: liminal space.
The abundance of biological waste in Beckett’s work produces the mixture of fascination
and revulsion that parallels Kristeva’s description of the abject. Kristeva illustrates the human
response when faced with the abject: “Loathing an item of food, a piece of filth, waste, or dung.
The spasms and vomiting that protect me. The repugnance, the retching that thrusts me to the
side and turns me away from defilement, sewage, and muck . . . The fascinated start that leads
me toward and separates me from them” (2). Excrement fascinates even as it repulses, a
biological function that figures a breakdown in the subject’s boundaries of self. Kristeva suggests
that excrement, when viewed as an element of the body’s inside that passes out of the body,
presents a breakdown of the inner and outer self as well as the relationship between subject and
object:
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The body's inside, in that case, shows up in order to compensate for the collapse
of the border between inside and outside. It is as if the skin, a fragile container, no
longer guaranteed the integrity of one's "own and clean self" but, scraped or
transparent, invisible or taut, gave way before the dejection of its contents. Urine,
blood, sperm, excrement then show up in order to reassure a subject that is
lacking its "own and clean self." (53)
Excrement constitutes part of the subject, but when expelled, it is denied relation to the subject
except as a jettisoned object. The body is faced with itself turned inside out, grossly poured out
in a fundamental defilement of the self and the borders the self erects in order to define itself.
The unclean subject is a subject that lacks a defined self. The “dejection of its contents” produces
revulsion in the subject. The erasure of borders is the abject—an undefined self cannot orient
itself according to the symbolic order. The only response when faced with the abject is spasms,
retching, and nausea: defensive mechanisms the body unconsciously mounts against the
dissolution of its borders.
The body reacts against the abject because the abject literalizes the breakdown of the
border between the inner and outer selves, as well as the border between subject and object.
Kristeva compares excrement to overt signifiers of death, stating, “Excrement and its equivalents
(decay, infection, disease, corpse, etc.) stand for the danger to identity that comes from without:
the ego threatened by the non-ego, society threatened by its outside, life by death” (71).
Excrement represents a danger to identity, the loss of self in abjection stemming from the loss of
a definable Other in order to shore up the boundaries of the self. Trapped in liminal space,
Beckett’s characters are faced with reminders of death but are denied aggregation out of their
current existence into a potential existence after death. Hamm complains that “[t]he whole place
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stinks of corpses” (47). This odor, like the stench that follows the excrement-caked narrator of
“The Expelled,” connotes decay, a decomposition of the body. This stench of decay is
everywhere in Beckett’s work. In Rough for Theatre I, A.’s proclamation, “It’s the same stink
everywhere” (231), may well be referring to this stench of decomposition that permeates
Beckett’s universe. Hamm recognizes that their enclosed room is filled with premonitions of the
death that awaits them outside. Hamm tells Clov to put him in his coffin, but Clov replies,
“There are no more coffins” (Endgame 130). Hamm cries out, “Then let it end!” (130), but it
does not end. The title of the play becomes a cruel joke—the characters in Endgame are moving
only towards the inevitable stalemate, as they always do, as they must do.
Nell delivers what could well be a thesis for much of Beckett’s humor when she says,
“Nothing is funnier than unhappiness” (Endgame 101). Beckett’s scatology is indeed humorous,
and the jokes produce laughter (both from the characters and from the audience), but not a
laughter that signifies identification with the characters. Laughter in Beckett further alienates his
characters due to abjection. In Waiting for Godot, Vladimir’s abrupt exits from the stage to
painfully urinate are played up for laughs, but his failing excretory functions bespeak a failure of
the container—a breakdown of the self. Kristeva describes laughter in the face of the abject as
“the gushing forth of the unconscious, the repressed, suppressed pleasure, be it sex or death. And
yet, if there is a gushing forth, it is neither jovial, nor trustful, nor sublime, nor enraptured by
preexisting harmony. It is bare, anguished, and as fascinated as it is frightened” (205-6).
Laughter often stems from aberration, a deviation from the expected or a dissonance in existing
harmony, and its joyous peals speak to the knowledge that the aberration will be set right: to
laugh is generally to affirm that there is an order that will be returned to. Laughter in Beckett
contains no such hope. The “gushing forth” of laughter that Kristeva describes is devoid of mirth
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and, instead, seems like another crack in the container. After Nag’s single phrase of prayer, he
orders them to wait, but after a brief pause announces, “Nothing doing!” (119). Hamm replies,
“The bastard! He doesn’t exist!” (119). The moment is humorous, a joke about their puerile
concept of prayer and their outrageous expectations for immediate relief. But the laughter from
the audience is not joyous; there will be no return to order in Endgame. These characters will
remain in their isolation. Anguished laughter pours forth, not from conscious joy but from
unconscious fear, an automatic response to an absurd universe.
This anguished laughter constitutes what Kristeva calls the “laughing apocalypse . . . an
apocalypse without god” (206). The laughter of Beckett’s characters is the only response they
have to their abjection: it is a recognition of the absurdity of their condition. Beckett’s characters,
stymied in their death desires, fundamentally compromised and trapped in liminal space, and
facing the horror of abjection, seem to have nothing to hope for but a divine intervention.
Beckett’s characters talk often of God, but even they know the futility of such hopes. While
listening to his tape, Krapp’s younger self laughs at the idea of “[c]losing with a . . . yelp to
Providence,” and the aging Krapp joins in this laughter (218). However, neither laugh is joyful:
younger Krapp laughs at the foolishness of yelping to Providence, and his older self laughs with
the added mordant bitterness of a lifetime that validated that skepticism. Providence would not
answer, even if Providence were there to answer. In Endgame, the characters react even more
viscerally to the idea of a divine presence. Hamm says, “Imagine if a rational being came back to
earth, wouldn’t he be liable to get ideas into his head if he observed us long enough . . . But
humanity might start from there all over again! Catch him, for the love of God!” (Endgame 108).
Hamm cannot imagine what a savior might do if he was to return; the “rational being” would
merely observe. He would be fundamentally unknowable—he would be a receding signifier, an
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Other that disappears in the face of abjection. The only thing worse than such a scenario, in
Hamm’s mind, is the horrific prospect of humanity beginning all over again. It would merely
dissolve once more into filth.
If only Godot would return, one thinks, the waiting would not all be for naught. Yet
Beckett denies his characters even this. If God were to descend into one of Beckett’s desolate
landscapes, he would not find flawed beings in need of salvation; he would find broken
containers, isolated from social structures, no longer discrete subjects with clear boundaries
between their inner and outer selves—their conscious and unconscious minds. He would find a
“laughing apocalypse” populated by excrement soaked fragments of people that have begun to
become indistinguishable from their own waste. An apocalypse marked by abjection, the absence
of definition that shores up existence, is not an apocalypse that will end in restoration. There was
never anything to restore. Kristeva sees “the breaking down of a world that has erased its
borders: fainting away. The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost of
abjection. It is death infecting life . . . It is something rejected from which one does not part,
from which one does not protect oneself as from an object” (4). When the subject can no longer
protect its own definition according to its relation with external objects, there is no final rest to
aggregate into.
One of Beckett’s narrators describes himself as “[a] carcass in God’s image” (Stories and
Texts for Nothing 108), and God is just that for Beckett’s characters: a carcass, a corpse, further
evidence of the abjection in which they are mired. Clov asks Hamm if he believes in the life to
come; Hamm responds, “Mine was always that” (116). There will be no life to come because
Hamm’s life has not yet come—he is not a discrete being, capable of assimilation into a
symbolic order. But of course, Beckett’s characters have known this all along. “The end is in the
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beginning and yet you go on,” Hamm says (126). The end has been clear from the beginning:
there is no end, and yet they go on: “Nothing to be done” (Waiting for Godot 11). As Kristeva
says, it is “[m]usic, rhythm, rigadoon, without end, for no reason” (206).
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Chapter 5: Conclusion: Not With A Bang, But a Fizzle
Augustine’s reminder that “we are born between shit and piss” has, for Augustine,
explicitly theological implications. The origins of human life so close to excrement serves as a
reminder of our fallen nature; we are humans born into sin, inherently fallen and in need of
salvation. The lament of the psalmist, “Surely I was sinful at birth, sinful from the time my
mother conceived me” (Psalm 51:5 New International Version), is a proclamation of truth that
applies to all human: “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:23 NIV). A
Christian teleology has an answer for these laments in the person of Christ, who came to forgive
and redeem His fallen people. In a Christian understanding of the universe, the sick are healed,
the broken are mended, and all are reconciled to Christ.
In Gene Edward Veith’s Reading Between the Lines: A Christian Guide to Literature, he
analyzes the reconciliation of Christian teleology in literary terms. Veith frames his discussion
using Dante’s definitions of comedy and tragedy. The distinction between the two forms lies in
the beginnings and endings. Veith sets out the simple definitions of the two: “A tragedy,
according to Dante, is a story that begins in joy but ends in pain. A comedy, on the other hand, is
a story that begins in pain, but ends in joy” (102). Despite the fact that one moves from pain to
joy and the other from joy to pain, “Both comedy and tragedy deal with the extremes of human
experience, and both put suffering and joy in relationship to each other” (103). In other words,
suffering and joy are equally essential elements of comedy and tragedy—any story with a
resolution must have both.
Although Beckett’s works indeed emphasize the pain in life, from the physical
discomfort of Vladimir’s bladder difficulties to Murphy’s fundamental alienation, his stories are
not tragedies as Veith would define them. Building from the writings of Aristotle, Veith states
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that, in a tragedy, “The ending must seem fair” (106). The fairness of the ending has much to do
with the sense of justice in a story: the character must be noble enough to earn sympathy but
must also have a flaw that validates his or her downfall. Beckett’s characters do not possess the
characteristics of Veith’s understanding of tragic heroes. The narrators in Beckett’s fiction are
not admirable or sympathetic. Vladimir and Estragon are frustratingly unable or unwilling to
move from their endless vigil for Godot, but also lack the capacity or the will to help Pozzo
when he appears to them suffering and lost. Although Beckett’s universe seems to prevent these
characters from significant action, the world that these characters inhabit does not validate their
behavior, but merely parallels their absurdity. They are not self-controlled beings capable of
meaningful action—and the failures of their excremental functions point to this lack of selfcontrol—but are instead compromised containers.
In addition to lacking the qualities of tragic heroes, Beckett’s characters do not inhabit
tragedies as Veith defines them because their stories do not offer the joy necessary to
counterbalance the pain and give it meaning. Beckett’s narratives do not begin in joy and
progress to suffering; they move from suffering to suffering. Some stories, like “The Expelled,”
begin with accounts of rejection from community, the moment when the characters are forced
intro liminal space. Others, like Waiting for Godot and Endgame, begin in medias res—in the
midst of their interminable suffering. Veith argues that those who “expect life to end in the
nothingness of death are assuming a tragic ending” (103). However, this “nothingness” is
expected to follow the joys of life intermingled with the pain. Beckett’s characters do not have
joys to mix with their pain. The obliteration of life with no promise of anything to follow is a
story that ends in pain. However, it is still a story that ends. Beckett’s stories deny their
characters endings.
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What both the tragic and comic understandings of life have in common is an ending.
Whether a joyous ending or a sorrowful ending, both versions find an end. Beckett’s works lack
such a definite ending. His characters, trapped in liminal space as they are, have no hope of
resolution. The emptiness of oblivion becomes tempting in the face of the alienation of abjection,
but even the Freudian death desire is frustrated. Beckett’s work cannot be said to have a “tragic”
ending because “[t]ragedy causes us to feel pity . . . This feeling is a manifestation of love”
(Veith 107). We do not pity Beckett’s characters—Beckett implies that their suffering is the
suffering that we all experience as fundamentally alienated people, but these stories preclude the
possibility of sympathy for Beckett’s characters. Their futile actions and absurd speeches are an
image of abjection, of the waste of human existence. They are images of our deepest fears of a
meaningless universe. Even tragedy produces a love for the characters through the sorrow of
their downfall. Beckett’s characters are not tragic, but absurd, unlovable because they are, in
some fundamental way, un-human. A tragedy implies that some system has been violated.
Tragedy relies on the hope of comprehensible order—an individual story may end in tears, but it
indicates a larger system of justice that provides the hope, at least, of resolution.
Beckett’s universe does not reflect these hopes. Augustine says, “A person who is a good
and true Christian should realize that truth belongs to his Lord, wherever it is found, gathering
and acknowledging it even in pagan literature” (On Christian Teaching 47). This creates
complications for the Christian searching for God’s truth in Beckett’s universe where a divine
presence is conspicuously absent, hope is replaced with despair, and everything that happens
seems to be purposeless and devoid of meaning. Beckett’s commentary on human nature through
his use of scatological images is particularly horrific for a Christian audience because these
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scatological images suggest that the human condition is so fundamentally compromised that
assimilation into a symbolic order—a subject interacting with a divine Other—is impossible.
Beckett does not definitively deny the existence of a divine presence, but instead
questions the efficacy of a divine being when humans are so fundamentally compromised. In
“Blind Waiting in Samuel Beckett,” Charles Courtney asserts, “It is clear to me that [with
Waiting for Godot], as with the later Endgame (1957), Beckett not only had the Bible in mind,
but was deeply familiar with it” (396). This much is abundantly clear in Beckett’s writing, which
also contains explicit references to God, although exactly what kind of God is being referred to is
debatable. The references to God in Beckett’s work do not express a longing for the salvation
that a divine being might bring, but despair at such a possibility. If we can, for a moment,
discount Beckett’s rigid insistence that Godot does not represent God, the failure of Godot to
appear might, at least in part, symbolize the failure of religion. However, this failure is not due to
the non-existence of God—Beckett does not affirm nor deny the existence of God. Instead,
Beckett’s images conjure a universe in which, it is implied, if God showed up, the salvation He
offers would not apply to or affect Beckett’s characters. These characters are compromised
containers, essentially liminal and unable to define the self. A divine being is Other, distinct from
humanity. If the subject cannot define the self, the subject has no framework with which to
approach the Other. Godot could walk into the last pages of Waiting for Godot; God could crest
the horizon line that beseeches and pulverizes Hamm and Clov; a savior would find only beings
with no clear division between their inner and outer selves. Scatological imagery in Beckett
literalizes the breakdown of inner and outer self and, further, the breakdown in the symbolic
order of subject and object relations. It is this breakdown of the symbolic order that eliminates
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the possibility of divine intervention—the beings that a savior would find are not discrete
entities. There would be nothing to save.
Beckett’s scatological images as seen through the writings of Freud, Lacan, and Kristeva
reinforce the deluge of circular, meaningless language in Beckett’s work. These images depict a
literal breakdown of division between the inner and outer self; the excremental functions that
keep waste biologically discrete from the subject have failed. Freudian psychoanalysis explains
how the ego moderates the unconscious impulses of the id, but Beckett’s characters lack this
distinction between ego and id. They seem to be all id—unrestrained language pours forth and
accumulates like waste. Similarly, the breakdown of excremental function suggests characters
whose very biology is liminal, not marked by completed rites and excremental functions, but a
collapse of the container. Also, the failures of excremental functions prevent Beckett’s characters
like the narrator of “The Expelled” from entering into society and participating in the social
order. This breakdown of the normal passage from separation to aggregation illustrates these
characters’ entrapment in liminal space.
Further, these scatological images demonstrate a breakdown in the subject’s ability to
enter into a symbolic order with the Other. Lacan describes the relationship of the signifier to the
signified as “an incessant sliding”; the accumulation of signifiers buries the signified in the
expression of meaning. The mirror stage marks the point at which the subject recognizes itself as
signifier and not just signified, as object and not just subject. In order for a subject to occupy the
realm of meaning and interact in the symbolic, it must fade from subject into object. Beckett’s
profusion of absurd, near-meaningless language and the corresponding scatological images
demonstrate the inability of Beckett’s characters to relate to the Other. If the subject cannot relate
to objects, it has no basis for a definition of the self. Again, the similar function of language and

Bradford 69
excrement in Beckett’s work demonstrates a collapse of Beckett’s characters’ inner selves.
Trapped somewhere between subject and object with no basis for self-definition, they cannot
move through liminal space in order to aggregate into the symbolic order.
Kristeva describes the liminal space beyond the relationship between subject and object
relations: the abject. The abject has no object that opposes and, therefore, defines it—the abject
is the horror in the face of the dissembling of boundaries that shore up our existence. Scat
provides an image for this abjection. The body, when faced with excrement, is faced with its own
decay. The breakdown of excremental function and the uncleanness and defilement that
breakdown entails marks an interrupted progression through liminal space. The failure of the
excremental process to resolve foreshadows the larger inability of Beckett’s characters to
aggregate into the symbolic order.
Because Beckett’s characters are unable to incorporate into the symbolic orders, the
existence of a divine presence does not promise a resolution to their stories. Beckett’s universe
resembles the one described by the narrator of Thomas Hardy’s “Hap”:
If but some vengeful god would call to me
From up the sky, and laugh: “Thou suffering thing,
Know that thy sorrow is my ecstasy,
That thy love's loss is my hate's profiting!” (1-4)
Hardy’s narrator is waiting not for a savior, but a “vengeful god” whose evil purposes would
give the narrator’s suffering order and comprehensible meaning. He could die, “Half-eased in
that a Powerfuller than I Had willed and meted me the tears I shed” (7-8). However, this is not
the case: “These purblind Doomsters had as readily strewn / Blisses about my pilgrimage as
pain” (13-14). There is no divine hand that guides events. Both bliss and pain are seemingly
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random and, therefore, absurd. Even a vindictive god would provide a type of order. Beckett’s
universe similarly lacks order or any discernible divine presence. Unlike Hardy’s narrator,
however, Beckett’s works do not bemoan the lack of a divine presence. Instead, the failure of
excretory function in Beckett’s works preemptively thwarts the efforts of divine presence, so
God’s existence or non-existence is, at most, unimportant.
It is not God’s failure to appear that gives Beckett’s work its darkly absurd quality, but
the implication that if God did appear, He would be unable to affect any change. Murphy
describes that, “Left in peace, [the patients in the hospital] would have been as happy as Larry,
short for Lazarus, whose raising seemed to Murphy perhaps the one occasion on which the
Messiah had overstepped the mark” (180). Murphy feels that the gift of resurrected life is not
much a gift at all. Murphy identifies with these psychiatric patients, feeling that if he and the
mentally disturbed alike were simply able to enclose themselves within their own mind and
isolate themselves from the world, they would find peace. Murphy seems to imply that a
resurrection is only as significant as the life one is resurrected into. He either unconsciously
ignores or consciously dismisses the concept of being resurrected into a higher existence beyond
the visible universe. The symbolic order is so fractured in Beckett’s work that his characters’ are
unable to fully recognize the concept of an afterlife different than the current one, or like Hamm
in Endgame, can only imagine such a concept with horror.
Throughout Beckett’s work, the suggestion of a divine presence never points to the
possibility of restoration or reconciliation into a comprehensible order. David Toor refers to one
of the most prominent “theological ironies” in Waiting for Godot: the two boys (or perhaps one
boy appearing twice) who tend the sheep and the goats. Toor states, “In Beckett’s ironic picture
of the God of modern man—if Godot be—it is the keeper of the goats, in Christian tradition
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representative of vice and evil, who is well treated by the master, while the keeper of the sheep,
the boy’s brother, is the one who is beaten and mistreated” (1). If Godot has any religious
significance, he is a perverse version of the Christian God; Godot intentionally mistreats the
keeper of the sheep, an animal symbolic of God’s chosen people. Beckett clearly does not use
Godot as a simple stand-in for Christ. However, Godot has religious resonances that are
impossible to dismiss: his return would, at least according to Vladimir and Estragon’s belief,
provide resolution to their story. His return would bring their salvation.
Courtney posits that when Pozzo appears in Act II “blind, needy, and reduced to being
‘one of the least” (397), Pozzo is the Godot that they are waiting for, one of the people Christ
refers to in Matthew 25:40 when he says “Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of
these my brethren, ye have done it unto me” (King James Version). According to Courtney, if
they were to reach out to Pozzo, they would have achieved the transformation of circumstance
that they are waiting for. If this is the case, then “Vladimir and Estragon are presented with the
opportunity to become sheep” (339)—they could, in theory, become like followers of Christ.
They do not “get it” because their “‘getting it’ will require that they, not someone or something
else, change” (339). They are waiting for something that will not come because what will affect
the change they seek is an internal change, not an external one.
Courtney’s analysis assumes that Vladimir and Estragon, even if just in the small ways as
how they reach out to Pozzo, are capable of change. He believes that the two are beings capable
of acting in ways toward the other characters that would change the narrative, potentially
reaching a conclusion beyond their eternal waiting game. However, this assertion includes an
assumption that Vladimir and Estragon are distinct from Pozzo and Lucky in their roles in the
story. Vladimir and Estragon represent those on a journey to find meaning, and Pozzo and Lucky
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are the people they encounter along the way that grant them opportunities to enact change, to
develop and change as characters. This reading of Waiting for Godot has more in common with
Pilgrim’s Progress than the actual plot of the play warrants, however. Waiting for Godot gives
us no indication that Vladimir and Estragon are any different from the other characters that
inhabit the play. Even though the relationship dynamics are different—Vladimir and Estragon
are friends while Pozzo and Lucky have a servant and master relationship—it becomes
increasingly unclear who is more interdependent: Vladimir and Estragon or Pozzo and Lucky.
All four characters share the experience of being compromised containers.
Lucky’s speech is indicative of his nature as compromised container and, on a larger
scale, the shared broken relationship between all of the characters’ inner and outer selves. In a
passage typical of the entire lengthy monologue, Lucky begins by formulating his speech like a
philosophical argument: “Given the existence as uttered forth in the public works of Puncher and
Wattmann of a personal God quaquaquaqua with white beard quaquaquaqua outside time
without extension who from the heights of divine apathia divine athambia divine aphasia loves
us dearly with some exceptions for reasons unknown…” (44). The idea of a personal God
appears here, interspersed with the interjection “quaquaquaqua.” Lucky’s language is, as
previously discussed, a logorrheic deluge that treats words like so much waste to be expelled.
Qua is a term used in logical and philosophical argument to mean “the capacity of being.” It is
striking, then, that Lucky’s language breaks down so sharply on “qua,” turning it into an absurd
stutter. The “capacity of being” becomes a tic or a trill. “Quaqua” is also a malapropism for the
French “caca” (Atkins 430). The “capacity of being” becomes shit as in Lucky’s explosion of
unrestrained id-speech.
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In his analysis of Lucky’s speech, Anselm Atkins divides the speech into three distinct
sections, each with its own version of a (admittedly fractured) syntactic structure. Atkins states
that “Part I is the unfinished protasis of a theological or philosophical argument presented
geometrically: Given. . . . It breaks off before the apodosis can be supplied. Note that the
existence of God is hypothetical, a mere postulate: If God exists, then . . .” (427). “Part I, then,
deals with the decline and demise of God” (427). Lucky’s argument never resolves, and the
play’s closest expression of direct theological argument dissolves because it does not matter.
God’s existence is immaterial, and all attempts to argue God’s existence are as meaningless as
Lucky’s intensely fragmented, nonsensical diatribe. Atkins notes that “[t]he attributes of the
personal God of religion, who is ‘uttered forth’ in revelation, are here mixed with those of the
God of speculative theology and philosophy, whose ‘existence’ must be discussed. The two
Gods appear to be contradictory” (430). Lucky’s attempt at logical argument breaks down as he
encounters inconsistencies in his versions of God. His argument, like most of Beckett’s
narratives, does not resolve, but trails off, unfinished because there is no end: there is no
resolution to achieve.
As the narrator of The Unnamable says, “shit, there we have it at last, there it is at last,
the right word, one has only to seek, seek in vain, in order to be sure of finding it in the end, it’s
a question of elimination” (359). Throughout his body of work, Beckett uses scatology as a motif
that parallels and reinforces the failures of communication. In this way, scatology is the image of
the broken human condition, the collapse of the discrete elements of the self, and the dissolution
of borders between the subject and object that allow self-definition and interaction within a
symbolic order. The abjection that Beckett’s scatology incorporates into his works represents
many of our deepest, most fundamental fears. Can we be known? Can we know ourselves?
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Beckett’s work has fascinated and haunted readers in part due to his refusal to answer these
questions. His characters are unmoored, undefined, and radically alienated. Beckett’s characters,
grotesque as they are, look a little more like us than we are comfortable admitting.
Although Beckett’s work has haunting implications for all readers, the experience of
reading Beckett produces a particular kind of horror for the Christian. A Christian understanding
of the universe has resolution at its center. The figure of the crucified Christ represents the
salvation of a broken people and their reconciliation into His divine order—that which is dead
will not stay dead, and that which is wrong will be set right. The Bible as a narrative work has
firm aggregation at its end with the Book of Revelation and the description of God’s people
finally entering into His kingdom. Beckett, although he does not deny God, denies this ending.
Through his scatological images, Beckett paints humanity as fundamentally compromised,
beyond saving, unable to achieve resolution. Beckett’s language-as-waste also contradicts a
Christian teleology. John 1:1 states, “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with
God, and the Word was God” (NIV). The Bible declares that followers of Christ are people of the
Word; Beckett strips the word of its significance. The Bible declares that Christ will come again
to save his people; Beckett asks if it isn’t a bit cruel to make someone do this all over again. We
are not people of the word, Beckett insists, but people of the fizzle, the foirade.
Beckett’s absurd universe entraps his characters in liminal space. Their excremental
functions do not resolve; their stories do not resolve. For the Christian reader, this lack of
resolution is the natural consequence of the unmooring of language from meaning, of humanity
from the symbolic order. Reality itself becomes unknowable. During his time at the hospital,
Murphy describes his frustrations at the shortsightedness of the doctors who assume that a
patient’s relationship to outer reality defines their stage of the healing process. In Murphy’s
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mind, this reliance on outer reality is unstable because outer reality itself is unstable: “The nature
of outer reality remained obscure. The men, women children of science would seem to have as
many ways of kneeling to their facts as any other body of illuminati. The definition of outer
reality, or of reality short and simple, varied according to the sensibility of the definer” (Murphy
177). Beckett here describes a world without an active divine presence, one where the definition
of reality depends on who is defining it. The Christian reader, when staring into the abjection of
Beckett’s absurd universe, sees a picture of what happens when we are denied endings—we drift
into utter alienation, language dissolving until it fades away into silence, and only one sound is
left echoing into the abyss: a wet fart.
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